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Abstract 
In endogenous growth theory technological progress is generated by accumulation of knowledge. 
This causes a number of problems, most importantly the scale dependence of technological 
progress. This paper develops a growth model where technological progress is based on sampling 
and selection from a Pareto distribution of technological possibilities. If sampling is purely 
random, slow growth is possible provided population increases, explaining the pre-industrial 
growth experience. If accumulation of experimental sampling mass is enough to boost the chance 
of success in further sampling, the explosive regime of endogenous growth is reproduced, 
explaining the double digit growth of transitional countries. The moderate growth of advanced 
economies is reproduced if basic research, modeled as a process of sampling and selection from a 
Pareto hypothesis distribution, is needed to improve the chance of experimental success. The rate 
of technological progress then mainly depends on a balance between the power of the technology 
function, which indicates how hard further innovation is, and the rate of learning to develop and 
test new hypotheses in basic research. A high rate of population growth somewhat increases the 
rate of technological progress, but there also is growth with a stable population. Directing basic 
research towards economic opportunities is detrimental to growth and may reduce the growth rate 
by as much as one half. The steady state is shown to be globally stable; in the steady state, the 
growth rate is independent of the research intensity, but the level of income depends on it. Given 
current OECD levels of R&D spending and saving, a one dollar increase of applied R&D 
spending will increase national income with 6-25 dollars and one dollar extra basic research by 
20-100 dollars. These rates of return are ten and thirty times higher, respectively, than those on 
physical capital investment.  
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1. Introduction 
Current levels of prosperity in the advanced countries are without historical precedent. It is 
uncontroversial that this is due to technological progress based on scientific discoveries. Yet the 
mainstream neoclassical theory of economic growth is almost silent on the role of basic research 
in economic growth. This theory is based on the premise that technological progress is generated 
by the accumulation of a stock of technological knowledge or ‘ideas’; apart from a few very 
recent papers, the literature does not differentiate the stock of knowledge into basic knowledge, 
applied knowledge or practical knowledge. This lack of resolution of the theory is a major 
problem in science and technology policy: there is no theory to guide the allocation of budgets to 
these three purposes. As a consequence, budgetary policies with respect to this field as well as 
priority setting within them are matters of taste and fashion rather than of rational decision 
making. In the present section we first briefly review the existing growth literature, then 
introduce our alternative and finally summarize our findings.  
 
The canonical endogenous growth literature 
That technological progress, not capital investment, is the ultimate driver of growth was 
established more than half a century ago by Solow (1956). This means that to understand 
economic growth one needs to understand technological progress. The current standard theory of 
technological progress is endogenous growth theory, also known as AK theory, (neo-) 
Schumpeterian theory and evolutionary growth theory. This theory has roots that go back to the 
1970’s (cf. Paul Romer, 1994), found a canonical form in the 1990’s with the work of Romer 
(1990), Grossman and Helpman  (1991), Aghion and Howitt  (1992, 1998), Charles Jones (1995a, 
b), Kortum (1997), Dinopoulos and Thomson (1998), Peretto (1998) and Young (1998), 
Segerstom (1998). At the end of the decade it was reviewed concisely and incisively by Charles 
Jones (1999) and won its proper place in macro-economic textbooks (David Romer, 2001).  
The basic approach is to assume that there exists a stock of knowledge or ideas that 
determines the level of technology and that this stock of knowledge can be increased by 
knowledge production in which the stock of knowledge itself plays a central role. There are many 
variations on the theory, but its core results are quite simple. Let the production function be ܻ ൌ ܣ݂ሺܭǡ ܮሻ where Y is national production of goods and services, K physical capital, L labor 
and A the stock of knowledge. The notation A goes back all the way to Solow’s (1956) seminal 
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paper, although he interpreted A not as the stock of knowledge but simply as a scalar that 
determines the level of factor productivity. Capital accumulates neo-classically, with fixed rate of 
saving; the stock of knowledge grows according toܣሶ ൌ ܮ஺ܣథ. Here a dot indicates a derivative 
with respect to timeǡ ܮ஺ is the labor force engaged in knowledge accumulation and ߶ is a 
constant,  positive,  parameter. The long term growth of the economy now sensitively depends on 
the value of ߶Ǥ If ߶ ൌ ͳǡand the knowledge producing labor force is constant, there is constant 
rate of technological progress and hence of long term economic growth; this rate depends on the 
size of the research labor force. This implies that the rate of growth depends on the expenditure 
on knowledge accumulation, which is intuitively appealing, but also that there is a scale effect: 
the growth rate depends on the size of the economy since expenditure on knowledge creation 
depends on it. Therefore a small economy has a lower rate of growth than a large one. Similarly, 
if the knowledge labor force grows exponentially, so does the rate of technological progress, 
causing per capita income to grow explosively. This explosive growth is lost if ߶ is smaller than 
one. In this case, development of new knowledge becomes more difficult as the stock of 
knowledge grows or, in Jones’s (1995) terminology, ‘fishing out’ makes new ideas more difficult 
to develop. Then, if the knowledge labor force grows at the same exponential rate n as the total 
labor force, the rate of technological progress converges to ݊Ȁሺͳ െ ߶ሻ and, with f Cobb-Douglas, 
the rate of growth of per capita output tends to 
௡ሺଵିథሻሺଵିఈሻǡwhere  ߙ is the factor share of capital. 
This means that the scale dependence has not vanished: per capita income grows only if there is 
positive population growth and on the steady growth path the levels of knowledge and income 
depend on the size of the population. If ߶ ൐ ͳǡin contrast, we once more obtain explosive 
growth, even if there is no population growth. In this case new knowledge becomes easier to 
develop if the existing stock of knowledge is larger, the ‘standing on shoulders’ effect (Jones, 
1995). 
Following Jones (1995, 1999), the endogenous growth literature identifies the dependence 
on scale as an undesirable feature, though there are some exceptions (e.g. …). Dependence of the 
rate of technological progress on the rate of population growth or even the absolute size of the 
economy is hard to reconcile with the historical experience in the advanced countries in the past 
two centuries: a moderate rate of per capita growth, irrespective of the growth of the populations 
and the size of the economies. Explosive growth is not realistic in the long either. It is a good 
description of a transitional development phase (notably Japan until 1980, China, India and Brazil 
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today) but this would mean that߶ changes with the stage of development and thus would require 
a new model with an endogenous߶. Moreover, explosive growth in the transitional countries 
mostly occurred after populations were stabilized and were certainly no direct consequence of 
rapid population growth. To counter these objections a way has to be found to ‘rescale’ 
technological progress. In the canonical endogenous growth literature cited above, this is done by 
assuming that the scale effect on R&D and technological progress is offset by a factor that 
increases the difficulty of innovation if the economy is larger. In particular, it is assumed that 
there is an increase in product diversity. If product diversity increases at exactly the same rate as 
the population and if for every product knowledge accumulation grows according to the equation 
with߶ ൌ ͳ, the explosive pressure of labor force growth or, in an alternative specification of the 
model, of technology driven income growth is precisely countered and the rate of technological 
progress once more can be constant, independent of n and dependent on the budget allocated to 
knowledge accumulation.  
The knowledge-accumulation-based models have a number of undesirable properties that 
hamper their effectiveness as underpinning of research and innovation policy. They depend 
sensitively on precise values of parameters that are hard to measure. Stable growth depends not 
merely on the precise value of ߶ but also on the precise balancing of labor force growth by 
increasing product diversity. The ad hoc nature of this assumption diminishes the explanatory 
power of the theory; arguably, steady state growth is assumed rather than explained. 
Conceptually, the assumption that product diversity depends on size as measured by population is 
not easy to reconcile with actual product diversity in European countries or Australia compared 
to the much larger US. Even if the world as a whole is considered, the models paradoxically 
imply that explosive growth could easily be obtained by limiting product variety.  
 
Extensions of the literature 
An alternative mechanism to prevent explosive growth was developed recently by Ben Jones 
(2010). He assumes that the time required to master the stock of knowledge in a field increases 
with the maturity of the field (his terminology is an increasing ‘burden of knowledge’), implying 
that individuals need to invest more time to become productive in innovation. Individuals choose 
fields, taking account of the burden of knowledge in a field, to maximize their lifetime chance of 
success, leading to a balance with the effect of increased availability of innovation resources 
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induced by economic growth. A drawback of Jones’s model is that his steady state growth rate 
(of which the stability is not established) depends on the existence of population growth. Without 
it, his growth rate is zero. Thus there still is a scale effect. More important, however, is that 
Jones’s this line of reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the cases where very major recent 
innovations have been made by very young people (e.g. the PC, internet search engines, social 
media) and with the fact that a large part of international academic articles is authored by junior 
researchers (PhD students and post docs), particularly in the sciences. It should be recognized 
that mastering existing knowledge, even if it is recent, is several orders of magnitude easier than 
discovery of new knowledge; this means that it is hard to see how the need to possess existing 
knowledge could explain a slowdown of discovery. In fact, it would seem that any realistic theory 
of technological progress should explain why transmission and use of existing knowledge is so 
much easier than development of new knowledge. Jones’s empirical arguments (notably that the 
age at which Nobel winning work and breakthrough patents are achieved has increased in the 
course of last century may very well be due to another factor entirely. R&D probably requires 
more technological resources today than a century ago and it has become embedded in much 
larger organizations. Therefore, command over resources and over the research agenda has now, 
just as in non-R&D sectors, become more like a management position achieved not much before 
the age of forty, rather than a matter of talent and creativity. Thus breakthrough work is being 
done at a later age not because much more knowledge needs to be mastered but because research 
freedom and availability of the needed technological resources comes at a much higher age than 
before. 
Since the canonical literature has been established a growing number of papers has been 
published with extensions, using the original basic mechanism for technological progress. An 
early review of some new developments was given by Dinopoulos and Şener (2007) but since 
then more has appeared. The presence of product diversity in endogenous growth theory, 
modeled as an easy to analyze continuum, has spawned a large number of papers harnessing that 
feature to describe phenomena other than macro-economic growth. It would be well worth the 
effort to write a full scale review of the literature focusing on the use of this mechanism, but this 
would be far beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead we just mention some important 
threads, and give some of the many references by way of illustration, to give an inkling of the 
scope of this literature. One important knowledge-related thread in the literature is to consider 
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how patenting systems prevent spillovers from making innovation work at the product level; this 
is analyzed by postulating that each product is produced by a monopolist in need of protection of 
the fruits of his R and D expenditure. Other threads link R&D to the business cycle and financial 
markets (e.g. Dosi et al.,  2010, 2012), consider the funding role of government, and extent the 
model to open economies. From the point of view of science and research policy the most 
important extensions are recent attempts to differentiate between basic and applied R&D: Cozzi 
and Galli (2009), Gersbach et al. (2008, 2009, 2010). Most elaborate is Gersbach et al. (2009). 
Their model is a variation of the original constant labor force endogenous growth model. The 
extension is that the production of knowledge is refined. A is a function of the available number 
of intermediate goods. To increase the latter requires first of all basic research results and on top 
of that applied research to turn them into actual intermediate products. Naturally, in this model 
growth ceases without basic research. But, though that case is not developed, growth should also 
become explosive if basic research and labor force growth are combined. The scale problem 
remains.  
Empirically, much work has been done (summarized by Donselaer, 2011), but the results 
are not uniform. Basically, differences in the rate of technological progress measured as the 
residual of the output growth less the sum of the growth contributions of non-knowledge 
production factors (Solow’s 1957 approach), cannot strongly support a particular one of the 
endogenous growth models. The evidence clarifies that R&D, population growth, human capital 
and interactions between countries have been are important factors in the advanced countries, but 
that the total (applied plus basic) research intensity does not play the dominant role predicted by 
endogenous growth theory (Madsen et al., 2010). In contrast, in case of the Asian transitional 
double digit growth countries, there is good evidence (Madsen, 2010; Ang and Madsen, 2011) 
that the research intensity is as important as endogenous growth theory indicates and is related 
directly to the growth rate. 
 
Our approach: R&D is not knowledge accumulation but sampling and selection 
The conceptual basis of the existing models is shaky in several respects. Whereas it is not 
impossible to measure the national stock of physical capital, it is hard to see how a similar 
measurement could be made of the national or global stock of knowledge (Steedman, 2003). New 
knowledge may replace existing knowledge, encompass it, enhance it, cause it to be forgotten, 
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build on it, and so on. Therefore there is no simple relation between the stock of knowledge and 
R&D. The latter is not simply the increment, gross or net, of the stock of knowledge. Similarly, 
Griliches (2000) in the book that summed-up his life’s work in the field, noted that R&D ‘capital’ 
does not simply depreciate as a consequence of the mere passage of time or of mechanical wear 
and tear, but can become obsolete simply because of new work. It is no coincidence that Jones 
(1995, 1999) did not even use the word stock of knowledge but preferred ‘stock of ideas’. The 
problem to define a stock of knowledge is exacerbated if one wishes, as makers of science and 
innovation policy must in their funding decisions, to distinguish between various types of 
knowledge or ideas. How does one add up the knowledge created in basic discoveries and 
knowledge created to achieve a specific application?  
This conceptual problem reflects the fact that the concepts of accumulation and saving 
that have been developed to describe capital formation are less relevant in the field of science and 
technology; mutatis mutandis the same is true of the concepts of product diversity and 
intermediate goods that have become an important tool in the literature. In both cases, models and 
terminology that are natural in the fields for which they were originally designed, are unnatural 
straightjackets in the analysis of R&D. This includes words like accumulation, competition, 
production, intermediate products, optimization; an outstanding example of the mismatch 
between the field and the analytical apparatus is the use of the term ‘spillover effects’ in case of 
basic research: it suggests that having their work picked up by others is mainly a nuisance to 
basic research workers! Much more relevant and natural in the field of R&D are concepts such as 
discovery, trial and error, serendipity, transmission, speed of learning, laws of nature, theories of 
everything, fractionalization of knowledge fields, and so on.  Therefore we introduce a theory 
that starts out from these concepts and use them to obtain an alternative neoclassical model of the 
generation of technological progress and economic growth.  
 
To achieve this we do away with the assumption that technological progress is produced 
or even created through accumulative processes. Instead we recognize that it is the result of the 
discovery of technological possibilities, possibilities that exist irrespective of whether human 
beings discover them or not.  We emphasize that discovery is the result of a trial and error 
process where samples are drawn from all technological possibilities and the best results are 
retained. Knowledge then is either of two things. First, a record of the results of previous 
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experiments; second, information on how to select a sample in such a way that the chance of 
success is increased. Consequently, two things are central in our approach: the inherent 
distribution of the technological possibilities and the sample selection process. With respect to 
distribution of the technological possibilities, it is clear that there are many different technologies 
that can generate a low level of productivity, but far less that result in a high productivity. A 
natural way to formalize this idea is to postulate the existence of technology density function that 
indicates what the relative number of technologies is that can generate a given level of 
productivity. We assume that his function has the shape of an inverse power law aka Pareto 
distribution. For growth analysis this distribution is particularly attractive because its shape is the 
same everywhere. The power݇of the technology function indicates how fast the density falls 
with increasing productivity and thus how fast innovation becomes more difficult. Given the 
technology function, technological progress can be described as sampling and selection regimes. 
Sampling corresponds with experimental development (applied R and D) of new technologies. 
The various basic models encountered in the endogenous growth literature for different values of ߶ are now obtained as a consequence of differences between sampling and selection regimes, 
irrespective of parameter values. These regimes are introduced in sections 2 and 3 and their 
growth implications are analyzed in sections 4 - 7. We briefly summarize the core features and 
results for these regimes here.  
· The simplest possible case occurs when there is no permanent sampling process but the first 
working technology found is used and no information is exchanged between regional 
communities; presumably this was the situation in the gathering and hunting societies that 
preceded the first agricultural economies. In this case the level of technology is simply the 
expected mean of the technology distribution and we have the original zero technological 
progress Solow model.  
· If experiments are unconstrained by prior information, but a fixed part of income is spent on 
them and the experimental result with highest productivity is retained, there is a stable but 
slow growth path provided population growth is non-zero (cf. section 4); this is similar to the 
case ߶ ൏ ͳin the endogenous growth literature and to Jones’s (2010) model. It can be 
identified with the growth process in pre-industrial agricultural societies, where some 
experimentation went on but no systematic development of the experimental process itself.  
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· In the next regime the information from the sampling process itself is sufficient to constrain 
the sampling process to exclude technologies with a productivity below the level where a 
critical experimental (sample) density has been achieved. This regime leads to the explosive 
growth corresponding to ߶ ൐ ͳ(cf. section 5), even if population does not grow. This 
corresponds to the double digit growth process of transitional countries and explains the 
results of Madsen and others cited above on the relation between the research intensity and 
growth in Asian transitional economies.  
· The final regime introduces basic research. After the onset of the industrial revolution, the 
accumulation of experimental mass is no longer enough in the advanced countries to 
constrain further experiments to potentially successful ones: it is necessary to discover the 
underlying laws of nature that constrain the technological possibilities. Unlike the 
endogenous growth literature implies, science’s role is not to open up technological 
possibilities, but to guide technological R&D away from unsuccessful avenues and thus to 
increase its effectiveness. The classic example is that no amount of unsuccessful 
experimentation could deter the alchemists from trying to make gold; the discovery of the 
basic laws of chemistry within the periodical system was needed to do that. That this is no 
mean feat is illustrated by the fact that Isaac Newton devoted more years to alchemistic 
experiments of which we now know they were pointless, than to his scientific discoveries on 
light and gravity that helped shape our world.  
Basic research amounts to developing and testing of hypotheses until one is found that 
provides a sufficient explanation of the data, in this case the experimental results leading to a 
given level of productivity.  We describe this process with a concept similar to the technology 
density function (cf. section 3): the hypothesis density function. Defining a research field as 
the development and testing of hypotheses to explain a given level of productivity (implying 
that there is an ever expanding continuum of research fields), a critical density of tested 
hypotheses has to be achieved. The speed with which this happens depends on the number of 
workers in the field and the fall of the time needed per hypothesis in that field due to learning. 
This leads to a stable steady state rate of growth of which the value depends on the balance 
between the speed of learning in new basic research fields and the increasing difficulty of 
innovation expressed in the power of the technology function (the steady state growth rate is 
given in section 6, its stability is shown in section 7). The growth rate also depends on the 
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rate of growth of the labor force, but does not vanish if the latter is zero. This case is a bit like 
the case in the endogenous growth literature where߶ ൌ ͳ and product differentiation 
balances the tendency to explosive growth, but unlike the literature it also generates steady 
state growth without population growth.  
The regime with basic research permits an analysis of some important policy issues. One is 
whether or not to target basic research. It has become fashionable in many countries to implement 
measures to direct basic research at specific business sectors or application fields that are deemed 
to be particularly promising economically. This amounts to a portioning of the basic research 
labor force according to fields. The alternative approach is to leave basic research free, implying 
that there is a kind of joint production process in all fields. It turns out that for a plausible range 
of parameter values targeted basic research leads to a much lower steady state growth rate than 
free basic research; a ballpark figure is that growth rate is halved by targeting (Cf. section 6).  
Another analysis that can be done is the effect of research spending on the level of 
income, or, more appropriately, on national consumption (Cf. section 8). The effect of course 
depends on both the (unknown) parameter values and on the values of the rates of spending on 
applied R and D and basic research themselves. Surprisingly, if these rates are small, the effect is 
completely dominated by the rates and virtually parameter free. For realistic cases, applied R and 
D will have a return of something like ten times that of spending on physical capital and basic 
research will have return that is 3 to 4 times as high as that on applied R and D. At current rates 
of spending of basic research of half a percent of GDP or less, one additional Dollar or Euro 
spent on basic research will raise national consumption by 50 to 100 dollars or Euros.  
Finally, the importance of basic research and its processes have science policy 
consequences. The dependence of the long term growth rate on the speed of learning in basic 
research implies that enhancing this rate of learning is important for economic growth.  This 
could be achieved by measures to speed up the dissemination of research results, such as 
immediate open access and electronic accessibility of all publications (for an estimate of the 
effects of free access cf. Houghton and Sheehan, 2009); full accessibility of data; complete 
publication of negative results; systematic reviews that are easy to understand for non-specialists, 
including outreach activities explaining results to a more general public; frequent contact 
between researchers in different countries, institutes and fields; reduction of administrative 
burdens; loss of research experience by people dropping out of the research system because of 
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lack of career opportunities, and so on. None of these measures are new, many of them have been 
and are advocated by learned societies, but our analysis implies that they should be regarded as 
not just nice to do, but as central to effective national and international innovation policies, 
perhaps instead of part of the subsidies and tax breaks that many countries now spend their 
innovation budgets on. 
The briefest possible summary of our results is that President Obama was right when in 
his 2012 State of the Union Address he declared, somewhat at odds with much of established 
theory and with current policies in most of the rest of the world, ‘Innovation also demands basic 
research.’ By our results, basic research is the dominant engine of prosperity in advanced nations. 
 
2. The technology function and the sources of technological progress 
In this section we introduce the concept of a technology function as a representation of the 
technological possibilities underlying past, present and future actual technologies. Furthermore 
we describe the processes of trial and error by which the actual technologies are selected from the 
technology distribution. 
 
Technology function 
Consider the standard aggregate production function where output or income ܻ is the total factor 
productivity ܣ multiplied by a linear homogenous function ݕ of capital ܭ and laborܮ: 
(1)   ܻ ൌ ܣݕሺܭǡ ܮሻ 
For any individual good or service, the total factor productivity may differ considerably between 
producers, localities, countries and dates. This can be due to both major and minor differences in 
technology and production processes. Very high and very low productivities may co-exist at the 
same date, and productivities may have been higher in some localities thousands of years ago 
than they are in other localities today (e.g. due to conditions of climate, soil, mineral and natural 
resources, presence of waterways, etc.). This variation implies that even at the micro level total 
factor productivities can be considered as a sample from a random distribution. Eo ipso, the 
aggregate total factor productivity can be considered as the average of a large number of samples 
from an underlying distribution. Houthakker (1953) already proved that a macro Cobb-Douglas 
function results from Pareto-distributed fixed coefficients technology at the individual level. We 
take this one step further and assume that the aggregate total factor productivity ܣ itself is the 
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average of a sample from an underlying distribution. This assumption implies that ܣ depends on 
two things: the underlying distribution and the sampling process.  
The underlying distribution is formalized by a probability density function݂ሺݔሻ, where ݔ 
is a value of total factor productivity. In economic terms, this function may be viewed as measure 
of the number of different technologies capable of generating total factor productivityݔ. In other 
words, the higher the value of݂ሺݔሻ, the easier it is to achieve a factor productivity value ofݔ. We 
will refer to this density function as the technology function and use the term technology point ݔ 
to indicate the technologies underlying a total factor productivity valueݔ. We make three general 
assumptions about its properties. The first is a positive minimum value ݔ௠௜௡ of total factor 
productivity; below the minimum the density is zero, ruling out negative output: ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ Ͳ 
forݔ ൏ ݔ௠௜௡. The second assumption is that there is no maximum total factor productivity and 
therefore no absolute limits to technological progress and economic growth: ݂ሺݔሻ ൐ Ͳ forݔ ൒ݔ௠௜௡. In its absolute form this assumption requires that no ‘theory of everything’ exists or, 
alternatively, that such theory allows infinite technological possibilities. This is the ‘endless 
frontier’ assumption of Vannevar Bush (1945) on which US science and technology policy has 
been based ever since he phrased it. Of course it is impossible to verify this assumption. 
However, it is a simple summary and a straightforward extrapolation of the historical experience 
until today. Nevertheless we temper it with a third assumption, namely that the technology 
function decreases as a function of the value of total factor productivity: 
ௗ௙ሺ௫ሻௗ௫ ൏ Ͳ for  ݔ ൒ ݔ௠௜௡. 
This implies that as higher and higher levels of factor productivity are achieved, further 
technological progress, though possible in principle, requires more and more effort. Our final 
assumption is that the mathematical expectation of ݂ሺݔሻ is finite. If not, even a completely 
random trial and error process would immediately lead to infinite total factor productivity, in 
evident contradiction to historical reality. 
These assumptions are satisfied by various distributions, including the upper half of the 
Normal distribution. We use the Pareto distribution. It is not only quite tractable but also 
embodies the power laws that usually pop-up in bibliometrics and scientometrics, most famously 
in Lotka’s (1926) law, which states that the number of papers per author is inversely related to 
the square of the number of authors, implying a Pareto distribution with a power of 2. The impact 
factors of articles and authors, the total number of publications of authors, as well as many other 
phenomena in knowledge fields have long tail distributions and appear to be ‘scale free’ in the 
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sense that they look the same everywhere; examples are given by e.g. Poiter (1981), Ivancheva 
(2001), Glänzel (2010), Li (2002). The Pareto distribution, perhaps generalized to account for 
another shape before the tail, is the natural form to describe this. The long tail phenomenon in its 
turn may be generated by underlying processes such as interactions in scale free networks ().  In 
our case only the tail is important and we can use the original Pareto form. Thus we have as 
probability density function (technology function) ݂ሺݔሻ, and cumulative density function ܨሺݔሻ: 
(2) ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ௞௫೘೔೙ೖ௫ೖశభ  (ݔ ൒ ݔ௠௜௡ ൒ Ͳǡ ݇ ൐ ͳሻ;  ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ͳ െ ሺ௫೘೔೙௫ ሻ௞ 
Here ݇ is the power of the distribution; the higher݇, the steeper the distribution decreases as a 
function of the total factor productivityǣ ݀  ݂ሺݔሻ ݀  ݔΤ ൌ െሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ.  The restriction ݇ ൐ ͳ 
assures existence of the mean.   
 
Pure trial and error 
We now turn to the sampling process that determines the actual total factor productivity. First, as 
a thought experiment, consider the purely static case. An example would be a large number of 
pre-agricultural societies with limited mutual communication, little opportunity to experiment 
with alternative means of production and almost no capacity for storing and transferring 
information about the results of experiments. Random differences would exist between the total 
factor productivities of societies but no systematic growth. On average the total factor 
productivity is simply the mean of the technology distribution: 
(3) ܣ ൌ ܧሺݔሻ ൌ ௞௫೘೔೙௞ିଵ     (Static case, pre-agricultural societies) 
As soon as there is some communication between societies and some permanent capacity to 
experiment because a small part of income is set aside for experimentation, the expected result is 
no longer the mean of the distribution but the expected maximum productivity within the total 
cumulative sample. A newly tried out technology replaces the current one as soon as soon as it 
yields a higher total factor productivity. This trial and error process will, for economies as a 
whole and over longer periods of time, lead to an increase of the total factor productivity. The 
process is a plausible source of progress in agricultural societies before the advent of systematic 
research and development in the seventeenth century. Formally, the cumulative use of a part 
income to trial and error amounts to a continuous process of sampling. This, in turn, yields a 
growing cumulative sample which we will refer to as the experimental mass. The actual factor 
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productivity can now be considered as the expected maximum of the cumulative sample. The 
maximum should be an increasing function of the experimental massܦ. That this is indeed the 
case is shown in the appendix. The expected maximum in a sample of discrete size m from a 
Pareto distribution is:  
(4a) ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ ൌ ݔ௠௜௡ ௠Ǩ௞೘ς ሺ௞௝ିଵሻ೘ೕసభ  
For large sample values we can approximate the discrete sample size m by the continuous 
experimental mass ܦ and obtain: 
(4b)  ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ ׵ ܦଵȀ௞   (Pure trial and error, pre-scientific agricultural societies) 
Hence in a pure trial and error process the total factor productivity ܣ ൌ ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯has a constant 
elasticity with respect to the (cumulative) experimental mass, the elasticity being the inverse of 
the power of the technology function. Clearly, if the power is high and the function as a steep 
slope, increasing the experimental mass has only a small effect on productivity.  The assumption 
that ܦ is continuous assumes that partial experiments are possible; since the technology function 
represents a national aggregate of many individual goods and services, each of which may have 
different technologies, this assumption is trivial. The economic growth of economies with pure 
trial and error technological progress is analyzed in section 3. 
 
Knowledge-based trial and error 
In a pure trial and error process the trials are a sample from the total distribution and there is no 
way to exclude the part of the distribution below the current total factor productivity from the 
sampling process. As a consequence, an ever larger part of the experimental technologies will 
turn out to have a lower productivity than current technology. In contrast, modern research and 
development does not try-out technologies at random, but makes use of accumulated knowledge 
and new research to obtain prior information to direct the experimental process towards the 
technologies that are most likely to lead to an increase in factor productivity. A natural way to 
stylize this is to stipulate that the sampling process eliminates a priori all technologies with 
productivities below a certain point, which we shall call the technology threshold. Then the 
expected total factor productivity is the conditional mean above the threshold. It is the ordinary 
conditional mean and not the expected sample maximum because in this case we want to 
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emphasize knowledge driven improvement, not uninformed trial and error. In the case of the 
Pareto distribution, if the threshold is ݒሺݒ ൒ ݔ௠௜௡ሻ the conditional distribution and mean are: 
(5)  ݂ሺݔȁݔ ൒ ݒሻ ൌ ௙ሺ௫ሻଵିிሺ௩ሻ ൌ ௞௩ೖ௫ೖశభ  ܣ ൌ ܧሺݔȁݔ ൒ ݒሻ ൌ ௞௩௞ିଵ 
Clearly (cf.4) the conditional distribution has precisely the same form as the original one, apart 
from being shifted to the right. This property of the Pareto technology distribution makes it ideal 
for the analysis of economic growth and the natural partner of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  
 
Relation between applied R and D and basic research. 
The specification of the impact of research and development on total factor productivity is now 
equivalent to specifying the mechanisms by which R and D affect the threshold ݒ in equation (6). 
To derive a realistic specification of those mechanisms we need to consider the nature of various 
types of R and D in some detail. The most common distinction is that between basic research and 
applied R and D. In a nutshell, this is the distinction between discovering the laws of nature and 
harnessing them for practical purposes. The more elaborate standard definition is given in the 
OECD (2002, p.30) Frascati manual for R and D statistics. Basic research is defined as: 
‘experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the 
underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any particular application or 
use in view.’ Applied research is defined similarly, but in this case ‘directed primarily towards a 
specific practical aim or objective’, and experimental development is defined as ‘systematic work 
drawing on existing knowledge gained from research and/or experience which is directed to 
producing …’ These categories of knowledge production are linked and need each other. To 
illustrate this we briefly consider two examples. The first is the classic and extremely well 
documented case of electromagnetism. Faraday’s experimental work over several decades (ca 
1810 - 1850) established the observational basis of electromagnetism. Maxwell (1865) then 
turned this into his unified electromagnetic field theory which subsequently facilitated the 
technological developments in the last part of the nineteenth century of Edison, Bell, Marconi, 
and others. Thus there was a sequence experiments → theory → applied R and D. The start of 
this sequence, however, was based in technology: many of Faraday’s experiments were only 
possible because of newly available equipment and tools. Even so, he sometimes needed to do lot 
of development work in adjacent fields, e. g. in chemistry to develop the required materials. Even 
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so, one of his experiments turned out to be impossible until new technological developments 
allowed Zeeman to do it in 1897. 
The second example is drug development. Until fairly recently, drug development was 
based exclusively on applied R and D or even on trial and error: large numbers of substances 
were tried out as treatment of particular diseases in test tubes, in test animals and finally in 
clinical trials of increasing size and sophistication. This development was mostly done without 
basic knowledge of how healthy organisms function at the cellular and molecular level and not 
guided by knowledge of the mechanisms by which a disease disturbs the healthy organisms. In 
fact, in many cases of successful drugs, the knowledge of how and why they work was developed 
after they had proven to be successful, and then only partially. As a consequence, the selection of 
new substances to test could at best be based on hunches and analogies only. This has led to ever 
increasing cost of drug development, if only because without solid basic knowledge the only way 
to prevent lethal side-effects is intensive large scale testing. At present, no more than twenty new 
drugs are admitted for use every year, at a cost of 50 billion US$. Only in last decade and half has 
the technology of molecular biology developed so strongly that it is has become conceivable to 
obtain complete knowledge of how a disease works before designing a drug. This development is 
very much technology driven: sequencing techniques and other bio-chip technologies have made 
it possible to do lab tests that used to take years and were extremely expensive in a matter of days 
or even hours at negligible cost. These new techniques, based on advances in information 
technology and nanotechnology, are now causing such a deluge of data that the search for 
patterns and the development of models to understand the data is becoming a daunting task. Thus 
the technological advances are now gradually providing the basis for the advances in basic 
knowledge that might eventually lead to more rapid and cheaper drug development.  
These two examples demonstrate three points: 
· Applied R and D without sufficient basic knowledge will eventually become unproductive. 
· Basic research requires an adequate level of technology and experimentation.  
· These linkages are not simultaneous but sequential and require a lot of time.  
Each of these properties are essential in the context of growth model: the model needs to take 
account of the fact that basic research in a field cannot start until a certain level of technology has 
been reached and a sufficient amount of experimentation has been done; applied R and D cannot 
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be considered effective unless sufficient basic knowledge has been obtained; and the time lags 
need to be taken into account.  
 
Critical density of applied R and D 
It is almost trivial that the technology threshold ݒ can only be increased after a sufficient amount 
of applied of R and D has been done at the corresponding the technology point. As before, we 
describe experimental work as the taking of random samples (experiments) from the underlying 
technology distribution; then we may formally define the experimental density ߜሺݔǡ ݐሻ at a 
technology point ݔ and time ݐ as the number of experiments that led to precisely the value ݔ of 
the total factor productivity. At any time, this density depends on the historical paths of both the 
experimental mass and the threshold. We again assume the experimental mass to be continuous 
and, moreover, sufficiently large for the difference between the expected density and the actual 
density to be negligible. Then atݐ, the change in the experimental density due to a marginal 
increase in the experimental mass and the density itself are: 
 (6)  
డఋሺ௫ǡ௧ሻడ஽ሺ௧ሻ ൌ ݂ሺݔሻȁݔሻ ൒ ݒሺݐሻሻ ൌ ௙ሺ௫ሻଵିிሺ௩ሺ௧ሻሻ   ߜሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ׬ ௙ሺ௫ሻଵିிሺ௩ሺ௭ሻሻ డ஽ሺ௭ሻడ௭௧଴ ݀ݖ    
The first condition for an increase of the threshold, a sufficient amount of experimentation, can 
now be formulated more precisely: a necessary condition for the threshold ݒ to increase is that 
the (expected) experimental density at ݔ ൌ ݒ is at least equal to a critical valueߜ௖. We will refer 
to this value as the critical density. We take ߜ௖ to be constant and independent ofݔ: differences in 
how difficult it is to develop new knowledge are already taken into account by the technology 
function. Define ݔ௖ሺݐሻ as the ‘critical point’ at timeݐ: the factor productivity value at which the 
density is precisely critical. In the appendix we show that the time derivative (time derivatives are 
denoted with dots) of the critical point is (all variables refer to time ݐሻ: 
(7) ݔሶ௖ ൌ ௞௞ାଵ ଵఋ೎ ሺ ௩௫೎ሻ௞ܦሶ  
As noted, the variable ܦis the mass of experiments. The production of experiments depends not 
just on labor, but also on capital and other material resources. In fact, because of the experimental 
and inductive, data driven, nature of applied R and D it is reasonable to assume that the 
experimental mass is produced with the same production function as output of ordinary goods 
and services. Therefore we can simply write 
(8) ܦሶ ൌ ݏ஽ܻ, 
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Where Y is national income (or total output) and ݏ஽the fraction of income spend on applied R 
and D; since we will use a neoclassical production function, this formulation implies that 
substitution is allowed between capital and labor in applied R and D.  
 
3. Basic research 
Production of basic research 
The second condition for the technology threshold to increase beyondݔ ൌ ݒ, is that a sufficient 
amount of basic research results pertaining to the technology point ݔ has been obtained. To 
obtain an appropriate measure of a ‘sufficient amount’ and how it is produced, we need to 
consider a number of aspects of the process of basic research. The first aspect is that of research 
fields. Each technology point represents an amalgam of production technologies of many 
different goods and services. Usually, increases in productivity do not occur to the same degree in 
all goods and services, but are concentrated in a number of industries, goods and services. At 
another technology point other industries, goods and services attain higher productivity gains. 
Therefore, at each point of the technology function, the required basic research results are based 
on a new mix of research fields. In fact, a continuous process of branching or fractionalization is 
exactly what is found empirically in scientometrics, cf. Van Raan (2000). This combination of 
shifts in the relative speeds of technological progress in industries, fractionalization of science, 
and intricate two-way relations between basic research and applied R and D, implies that each 
technology point ݔis associated with a unique mix of basic research fields, which we simply dub 
‘field ݔ´. In view of the embedment of basic research in particular technology and experimental 
equipment, basic research in fieldݔcan only start once critical experimental mass has been 
achieved at technology pointݔǤ  
The second aspect of basic research that needs consideration is the nature of this research. 
In textbooks, the exposition usually suggests an orderly progression of knowledge development 
where new contributions build on older work in a natural way, quite predictable by hindsight. 
Only very infrequently are there surprises, flashes of inspiration, caused by persons of extra-
ordinary genius. This view of science was made canonical by Kuhn who implied that apart from 
the occasional paradigmatic change, the overwhelming majority of scientific work is more or less 
routine, straightforward work. The unpredictable part of research, the paradigmatic changes, were 
made even more out of the ordinary by stipulating that only young scientists made these changes 
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and they are usually only accepted by the profession after the older generation has cleared the 
field.  
It is however a cliché that basic knowledge in the making is something quite different 
from textbook knowledge. Actual research is much messier. Many things fail, successful things 
come as a surprise. Rather than a combination of normal accumulative work and very infrequent 
upheavals, it is continuous alternation of routine progress and upheavals of all sizes, staying with 
an approach for some time and hitting on and making paradigmatic changes of all kinds of 
magnitude. It is an amalgam of inspiration, groping in the dark, tenacious hard work, learning, 
and serendipity. There is not a dichotomy of a very small number of very major discoveries and 
very large number of routine stuff, but a power law, or at least a distribution with a long tail, 
where the pattern of new directions and routine continuation is repeated at every level in the same 
way. This is true per field, for the distribution of discoveries over individuals, and even for the 
distribution of discoveries within the work of individuals.  
This process cannot be dealt with by a simple accumulation model. Instead, we again 
have to turn to a model of trial and error under uncertainty, with gradual learning. The units of 
this trial and error process are hypotheses about ‘the underlying nature of phenomena end 
observable facts.’ The process of basic research can be described as the development and 
elaboration of hypotheses, the analysis of their internal consistency, foundations, consequences 
and relation to other hypotheses, the testing of their compatibility with stylized knowledge of 
phenomena and detailed data, and their successfulness in prediction and in generating 
applications. This description can be summarized as ‘developing and testing hypotheses’. To 
make this description amenable to quantitative analysis, we have to define a unit of measurement 
of hypotheses. This is quite straightforward in the context of the technology function model: all 
potential hypotheses in field ݔcan be ordered according to the value݄of the total factor 
productivity they generate. Here ‘generate’ means that they allow for raising the technology 
threshold to݄.  Having established this definition, we can model the trial and error process in a 
way that is similar to what we already did in case of technology: define a distribution function, 
then a selection process and finally derive the expected value of ݄ǤThe probability density 
function for basic research hypotheses in fieldݔǡor ‘basic knowledge function’, is ݃௫ሺ݄ሻ. Of 
course, this function could be any shape. However, in view of the preponderance of power laws 
in scientometrics, it is again natural to use a Pareto function. In principle, both the power and the 
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minimum of this function could be field dependent. However, to avoid unnecessary extra 
parameters we assume a power that is the same for every field and, moreover, identical to the one 
of the technology function݇. We also assume that the minimum is the same in every field. This 
makes sense if the complexity of the development of new technology derives from the 
complexity of the basic knowledge needed to underpin the technology. We can now write the 
basic knowledge function for fieldݔ: 
(9) ݃௫ሺ݄ሻ ൌ ௞௛೘೔೙ೖ௛ೖశభ     
To complete the description of the process of basic research, we need to specify how the selection 
of hypotheses works. There are two major differences with applied research: with respect to the 
factors of production and with respect to learning. In case of basic research the critical production 
factor is labor. Though instruments have to be built in observational and experimental basic 
research, the restrictive factor usually is labor. Consider the development of molecular biology. 
The rapid development of DNA-chip technology has greatly increased the research possibilities, 
but this technology does not replace researchers, it allows them to do things that were not 
possible before. The critical role of labor is even stronger in theoretical work: Einstein’s ten year 
hike from special to general relativity could not have been appreciably shortened by providing 
him with many more material resources (cf. Isacson, 2007). Consequently, a Harrod-Domar 
production function is natural for basic research; of course in this model material resources can 
also be the limiting factor, but in our case we can ignore this possibility since we already have 
assumed that critical experimental mass has to be achieved before basic research can start in a 
field.  
The second major difference is learning. Later work in a field is easier because new 
analytical tools have been developed, unsuccessful approaches identified and unfamiliar concepts 
internalized. Also, earlier work is an input for later work and makes this easier. This learning 
process is reinforced in cases where growth in the volume of basic research in a field creates a 
market for technological tools which, once available, boost productivity. At present, this process 
is particularly strong in biomedical research, but it is also evident in e.g. ICT, nano-science, 
software production. In terms of hypothesis selection, the essence of learning is that the 
experience with the development and testing of hypotheses helps in selecting further hypotheses 
that have a higher chance of being successful than those in the original distribution. Thus, just as 
in applied work, there is a threshold that is raised by the research process. In basic research, this 
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process is in one sense stronger than in case of applied research. Any researcher who succeeds in 
developing a successful hypothesis can immediately build on it in the selection of further work. 
However, in basic research there also is a restriction with respect to learning: it is an individual 
rather than collective process. Consider a thought experiment: suppose that not just Einstein 
would have worked on the general theory of relativity, but 1000 Einsteins who communicated 
only through the literature. Clearly, this would not have sped up the process of discovery much. 
Even if they would have cooperated quite closely, the gains would probably have been minor, 
because each of them would have had to try much the same approaches at the same time, each 
making comparable errors and exploring the same blind alleys before being convinced that they 
were errors and blind alleys. Isacson’s (2007) description of the situation in 1915, ten years after 
the special theory of relativity, is quite instructive. Einstein had lectured on his approach and this 
had caused the greatest mathematician of the time, Hilbert, to work on the problem. Though this 
competition spurred Einstein on, it did not help him intellectually in any way at all, the solution 
he found was his and his alone. Of course this example cannot be completely generalized to all 
theoretical work; nor is all basic work theoretical. Yet it seems safe to say that in basic research, 
learning processes are sped up only a little by increases in the total mass of work done in the field 
but mostly depend on the cumulative experience of the standard worker in the field. This is not to 
say that the number of workers has no influence on output: given the state of learning, the 
number of workers determines the sample mass that is achieved in a field and therefore research 
output as long as that is defined as the maximum of the sample hypotheses.  
We will now formalize these ideas in a model of basic research production. This consists 
of two parts: a learning equation and an output equation. To obtain the learning equation, let the 
average worker draw a series of successive samples from the hypothesis distribution and let the 
threshold in each sample be a function of expected results of the last sample. More precisely, let 
each successive sample require the same number of working hours ߝ and let the total number of 
hours worked by a standard worker in fieldݔ since work started be߬௫. Suppose each sample 
draw causes an increase in the threshold that reduces the remaining mass of the distribution with 
a fractionߪ. Then we obtain from (2) for the relation between successive thresholds: ݒሺ߬௫ሻ ൌݒሺ߬௫ െ ߝሻሺͳ െ ߪሻିభೖ ൌ ݒሺ߬௫ െ ݅ߝሻሺͳ െ ߪሻି ೔ೖǤ If ߬௫ is a multiple ofߝ, setting ݅ ൌ ߬௫ ߝΤ  and 
noting ݒሺͲሻ ൌ ݄௠௜௡we obtain: 
(10)  ݒሺ߬௫ሻ ൌ ݄௠௜௡݁ഇೖఛೣ  
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Hereߠ ൌ െ ଵఌ ሺͳ െ ߪሻ. Consequently, the threshold grows exponentially as a function of the 
total time since research in field started. Thus the rate of growth is: 
· Inversely proportional with the power of the basic research function݇ǡthat is, with how 
difficult it is to obtain results in the field concerned 
· Inversely proportional with the timeߝeach sample draw requires; ߝ can be interpreted as the 
time required for the production of units of basic research output that are communicable 
between researchers. Therefore, more frequent publication, better access to publications and 
improved communication technologies are all reflected in a lower value ofߝǤ 
· Proportional to the logarithm of the reduction ߪof the mass of the basic research distribution 
by each draw.  
The latter merits some further elaboration. Newton famously said he only peered further because 
he stood on the shoulders of giants. Our little model of learning applies this Newtonian phrase by 
stipulating that each new period of basic research in a field stands on the shoulders of the results 
of earlier periods; the parameterߪindicates how much the shoulders grow in each period. Two 
examples satisfying the condition of a constant reduction rate of the remaining basic knowledge 
distribution mass are the expected sample mean and sample maximum. In case of the sample 
mean we find ߪ ൌ ͳ െ ሺ௞ିଵ௞ ሻ௞ and in case of the maximum  ߪ ൎ ͳ െ ቀ௞ିଵ௞ ሻି௞ ሺఌ௞ିଵ௞ିଵ ሻିଵǤ In each of 
these cases the threshold grows exponentially, though at different rates. In fields with rapid 
improvement of instrumentation due to the demand from the field itself, the value of ߪis higher 
than in fields where no such improvement is possible.  
We can now define basic research production in field ݔ at time ߬௫ after the start of basic 
research in that field as the expected maximum sample value of the hypotheses in that field. As 
indicated above, we assume that the number of hypotheses that can be tested is proportional to 
the available amount of labor. In the appendix we show that if the labor force in a field grows 
exponentially, the expected sample maximum and hence the production of basic research is given 
by: 
(11) 
ௗ஻ೣௗఛೣ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ௫݁ఏఛೣሻభೖ  
Here ܤ଴ is a constant and ܮ௫ is the basic research labor force in field ݔ. Equation (11) represents 
a Harrod Domar production function with two modifications. Firstly, knowledge production is 
not a linear function of labor but an iso-elastic function, the elasticity being the inverse of the 
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power of the basic knowledge distribution function. Secondly, learning is accommodated by an 
exponential growth of productivity in each field after research has started there. This basic 
knowledge production function resembles Romer’s (1990) knowledge production function. The 
two most important differences are that (11) refers to basic knowledge only, not total 
technological knowledge; and that the time variable in (11) is not the absolute time of the growth 
model but just the time since the start of research in field ݔ. And, of course, (11 is the result of a 
derivation based on explicit and fairly general assumptions about learning in basic research. 
Though in the derivation of (11) we assumed that the labor force in fieldݔgrows exponentially, 
we will also use the equation in section 5 for the case where labor force growth need not be 
strictly exponential. 
 
Transitional and advanced economies 
Let ܤ௫ be the supply of basic research at ݔ, that is the cumulative production of basic knowledge 
pertaining to ݔ. Then the complete condition for research driven technological progress is: 
(12)  
ௗ௩ௗ௧ ൐ Ͳǡ ݔ ൌ ݒǡ ߜሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൐ ߜ௖ܤ௫ ൒ ݔ 
We will assume that the actual factor productivity is the conditional expected value of the 
technology function. This condition makes it possible to distinguish two very different growth 
situations. First, suppose that the level of basic knowledge is much higher than the one 
corresponding to the actual technological level of a country. Then the basic research restriction in 
(12) is irrelevant and technological progress can be achieved by applied R and D alone. This is 
the situation in transitional economies such as China, India and Brazil at present, or Japan and 
Korea in the decades prior to 1980. Of course, in these cases, applied R and D includes the 
buying of licenses and other ways to import technology from abroad. Even so, however, a lot of 
work has to be done to master and apply technologies. Transitional economic growth is analyzed 
in section 4.  
 
Targeted and free basic research 
Next, in section 5, the situation of the advanced countries is analyzed, mainly North America, the 
European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Japan. In these countries, basic knowledge 
is not ahead of applied knowledge but basic research is needed to achieve technological progress.  
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In equation (11) the production of basic knowledge in a field depends on the labor force that is 
active in that field. We need to describe how this labor force in field ݔis determined; perhaps 
surprisingly, this requires some further reflection on the nature of basic research. There is little 
doubt that the total basic research labor force is essentially exogenous: it depends on available 
budgets and these, in turn, depend on politically determined public funding, on the grant positions 
of universities and other research institutions and on private donations. Funding of basic research 
is mostly separate from funding of applied R and D: the latter is largely funded by the business 
sector; the part that is publicly funded is mostly in areas of government services. Thus for all 
practical purposes the funding of basic research is separated from that of applied R and D. 
Consequently, we may simply assume that the basic research budget and therefore the size of the 
total basic research work force is exogenous; we will assume that it grows exponentially and at 
the same rate as the total labor force. But this leaves open how the basic research labor force is 
allocated to fields. At first glance it seems reasonable to assume that it is allocated proportionally 
to all active basic research fields. These can be defined as the fields corresponding to technology 
points whereݒሺݐሻ ൏ ݔሺݐሻ ൏ ݔ௖ሺݐሻ: critical experimental mass has been achieved at timeݐ 
(ߜሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൐ ߜ௖ሻbut the amount of basic knowledge still falls shortሺܤ௫ሺݐሻ ൏ ݔሺݐሻ). If the total 
basic research labor force isܮ௕ ǡthe allocation to fields must satisfy ܮ௕ሺݐሻ ൌ ׬ ܮ௭݀ݖǤ௫೎ሺ௧ሻ௩ሺ௧ሻ A simple 
allocation that meets this requirement is ܮ௫ሺݐሻ ൌ ௅್ሺ௧ሻ௫೎ሺ௧ሻି௩ሺ௧ሻ and we will use this ‘proportional 
allocation’ as one of two models in our dynamic analysis.  
However, this allocation is likely to be too restrictive given the nature of a basic research 
‘field’ in our analysis. Remember that our fields are made up of a mixture of basic research 
disciplines as commonly understood. This means that researchers are in fact working on subjects 
that are not just relevant to one technology point, but to a range of them and often nobody knows 
where the applications will actually be. Thus, in condensed matter physics, workers are not 
looking at problems that are relevant to the industries where technological progress requires more 
basic knowledge in condensed matter physics, but on those problems where opportunities for 
progress in condensed matter physics appear greatest. Their solutions will not just help to remove 
some current barriers to technological progress in some industries, but also to help speed up 
innovation in other industries in the near future. In terms our x-fields corresponding to technology 
points, workers in all disciplines work simultaneously on all problems for a sufficient embedment 
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in experimental and observational evidence has been achieved, irrespective of the precise 
applications for which this knowledge will eventually serve. Therefore, a ‘joint production’ 
model is likely to be more realistic in our description of basic research then the proportional 
allocation model given above. The latter assumes that the work force is completely partitioned 
along the lines of the technology points, whereas a joint production model assumes that the work 
force as whole works simultaneously on all technology points. In our dynamic analysis we will 
therefore use a second model which simply saysܮ௫ ൌ ܮ௕.  
The difference between the proportional allocation model and the joint production model 
is quite interesting from a science policy point of view. In innovation policy, funding instruments 
are often targeted at specific economic sectors that are deemed to be of special importance or 
promise to a country. Academic leaders, in contrast, usually argue that basic researchers are best 
left free, so that they can guide themselves towards the problems where the opportunities for 
discovery are greatest. Our model of proportional allocation can be viewed as a representation of 
targeted basic research, and the joint production model as non-targeted, or free, basic research. 
Naturally, in the joint production model, the constant term ܤ଴in the basic research production 
function must be reduced proportionally in order to obtain initial equal productivity of both 
models; this way, the focus of our analysis is purely on the dynamics of both models and thus on 
the different implications of targeted and free basic research for economic growth.  
 
4. Growth with pure trial and error invention. 
In this section we derive the growth path of neoclassical economy with the pure trial and error 
invention that can be associated with pre-scientific agricultural economies. We use a simple 
linear homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(13)   ܻ ൌ ܣܭఈܮଵିఈ , ݃௒ ൌ ݃஺ ൅ ߙ݃௄ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݃௅ 
Here the growth rate of variable Z is denoted by݃௓. We assume constant rates of saving for 
capital accumulation and experimentation, ݏ௄ and ݏ஽ respectively, and we assume that both 
investments and experimentation require the same mix of goods and services as total output. 
Then:  
(14)  ݃௄ ൌ ݏ௄ ௒௄ Ǣ ݃஽ ൌ ݏ஽ ௒஽   
Labor grows at a constant natural rate ݊ and total factor productivity is determined by (4): 
(15)  ݃௅ ൌ ݊ 
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(16)  ݃஺ ൌ ଵ௞݃஽  
Of course, if in (16) we would replace ݃஽ by a constant, we would have Solow’s standard 
neoclassical model with exogenous technological progress. It is now quite straightforward to 
derive the condition for steady growth: (13), (15) and (16) yield:  
(17)  ݃௒ ൌ ଵ௞ ݃஽ ൅ ߙ݃௄ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݊ 
Denoting time derivatives by dots, (12) implies 
(18)  ሶ݃௄ ൌ ݃௄ሺ݃௒ െ ݃௄ሻ  ሶ݃஽ ൌ ݃஽ሺ݃௒ െ ݃஽ሻ 
As ݃௄and ݃஽are strictly positive, they must converge to ݃௒ if the latter is constant. Substituting 
this into (17) yields the steady growth rate 
(19)  ݃௒ ൌ ሺଵିఈሻ௡ଵିఈିଵ ௞ൗ     
Thus the existence condition for steady growth is ͳ െ ଵ௞ െ ߙ ൐ Ͳ  or  
(20)  ݇ ൐ ଵଵିఈ 
Thus the power of the technology function should not be too small or, loosely formulated, 
innovation should not be too easy. If the power is too small, investments in trial and error 
generate so much technological progress and extra income that a positive feedback makes the 
growth rate explode (cf. figure1 below). Since such explosive growth has never been observed in 
pre-scientific societies, this puts a lower boundary on the power of the technology function. The 
lower boundary depends onߙ; if factor markets are efficient this coefficient corresponds with 
capital’s factor share and (20) requires that the power of the technology exceeds the inverse of 
labor’s share. A glance at national accounting data shows a labor share of about two-third to be 
common, indicating a lower boundary of 1.5 for the power. If (20) is satisfied, per capita income 
growth is ௡௞ሺଵିఈሻିଵ. This is positive if the labor force grows. At low values of݇, if innovation is 
easy, per capita growth is highest, at higher power-values it is negligible.  
To analyze the stability of the system, substitute (17) into (18) to obtain: 
(21) ሶ݃௄ ൌ ݃௄ሼ݃஽ ଵ௞ െ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݃௄ െ ݊ሻሽ  ሶ݃஽ ൌ ݃஽ሼ݃஽ሺଵ௞ െ ͳሻ ൅ ߙ݃௄ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݊ሽ 
(22) ሶ݃௄ ښ Ͳ ՞ ݃௄ ڙ ݊ ൅ ଵ௞ሺଵିఈሻ݃஽  ሶ݃஽ ښ Ͳ ՞ ݃௄ ښ ሺ௞ିଵሻ௚ವఈ௞ െ ଵିఈఈ ݊ 
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The phase diagram corresponding to (22) is given in figure 1. The left hand side shows that if the 
existence condition is satisfied the system converges to the steady growth path from any initial 
situation; the right side shows explosive growth if the existence condition is violated.  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Phase diagrams for pure trial and error growth. 
 
5. Transitional growth 
In this section we derive the growth path of economies that invest in applied R&D but do not 
have to invest in basic research because the freely available level of basic knowledge is higher 
than that required at their level of technological development; in terms of condition (12): ܤ௫ ൒ ݔ. 
Then the threshold ݒ in equation (6) increases to ݒ ൌ ݔ as soon asߜሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൒ ߜ௖. Initially, when 
the cumulative experimental mass is small, the threshold is at the minimum ݔ௠௜௡ of the 
technology function. Once the experimental mass has grown sufficiently to achieve critical 
density atݔ௠௜௡, the threshold starts increasing and remains equal to the critical point. Until that 
momentܨሺݒሻ ൌ ܨሺݔ௠௜௡ሻ ൌ Ͳ and (6) is simplified toߜሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ݂ሺݔሻܦሺݐሻ. Defineܦ଴ ൌߜ௖ ݂ሺݔ௠௜௡ሻΤ . After criticality has been achieved atݔ௠௜௡, the threshold is equal to the critical 
point (ݒ ൌ ݔ௖ሻ and its time derivative can be obtained directly from (7): 
(23) ݒሶ ൌ  ௞௞ାଵ ଵఋ೎ ሶ   
Using (5) we now obtain for the change in total factor productivity: 
 
݇ ൑ ͳͳ െ ߙ ݇ ൐ ͳͳ െ ߙ 
݀݃௄݀ݐ ൌ Ͳ 
݊ 
െͳ െ ߙߙ ݊ 
݃஽ 
݀݃஽݀ݐ ൌ Ͳ 
݀݃௄݀ݐ ൌ Ͳ ݃௄ 
െͳ െ ߙߙ ݊ 
݊ ݃஽ 
݀݃஽݀ݐ ൌ Ͳ ݃௄ 
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(24) ܣሶ ൌ ௗாሺ௫ȁ௫ஹ௩ሻௗ௧ ൌ ௞௞ିଵݒሶ ൌ ௞మ௞మିଵ ଵఋ೎ሶ  ՜  ஽՜ஶ݃஺ ൌ ݃஽
This equation replaces equation (13) of the model of section 3. The other equations, (13)-(15), 
remain unchanged. Since  ܦ is strictly increasing (cf. 14), (24) implies ௧՜ஶ݃஺ ൌ ݃஽ and (17) 
becomes: 
(25) ௧՜ஶ݃௒ ൌ ݃஽ ൅ ߙ݃௄ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݊ 
Consequently, the equivalent of (21) is: 
(26) ௧՜ஶ ௚ሶ಼௚಼ ൌ ݃஽ െ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ ቀ௧՜ஶ݃௄ െ ݊ቁ ௧՜ஶ ௚ሶವ௚ವ ൌ ߙ௧՜ஶ݃௄ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݊ 
Since ݃௄ is positive, the right hand part of (26) implies that ݃௄ keeps on increasing as long as the 
natural rate is non-zero. The left hand implies 
(27) ௧՜∞ ௚ሶ಼௚಼ ښ Ͳ ՞ ௧՜∞݃௄ ڙ ௚ವଵିఈ ൅ ݊ 
Thus if ݃௄ is smaller than the extreme right side of (27) it increases, and if it larger it also 
increases since the extreme right hand side itself increases. It is not difficult to see that ݃௄ and ݃஽also keep on increasing if the natural rate is zero. Consequently, with transitional growth, the 
growth rate of per capita income keeps on increasing and we obtain explosive economic growth. 
This corresponds quite well with the double digit growth usually seen in transitional economies. 
However, as soon as technology threshold ݒ has increased so much that it approaches the level 
associated with the state of basic knowledge (formally: when ܤ௫ ൒ ݒ starts to be violated), the 
explosive growth will end and a new regime will be entered, dictated by the advance of basic 
knowledge. 
 
6. Technological progress by basic research: the steady state growth rate. 
In this section we investigate how basic research as defined in section 3 generates economic 
growth when the level of basic knowledge is the restrictive factor in technological progress. We 
first give the basic equations, then analyze the existence conditions for steady growth, then the 
stability of the steady growth rate and finally the relation between the steady state level of income 
and the propensity to spend on basic research. We analyze the steady state for both for the joint 
production and the proportional allocation models introduced in section 3, but leave the 
derivation for the proportional allocation model to the appendix. 
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Dynamics 
As in section 5, we can retain equations (13)-(15) but have to develop a new equation for the total 
factor productivity A. As in section 5,ݔ௖ሺݐሻ is the x-value where critical mass is reached at time 
tǤ Critical mass is determined by (7) and can be written in growth rates as: 
(28) ሶ݃௫ ൌ ݃௫ሼ݇݃௩ െ ሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ݃௫ ൅ ݃௒ሽ 
Here ݃௫is the growth rate ofݔ௖ሺݐሻ. The growth rate of the threshold, and therefore the rate of 
technological progress, is now determined by basic research. In section 3 we already introduced 
the assumption that the total basic research work force grows exponentially at the natural rate: 
(29) ܮ௕ ൌ ܮ஻଴݁௡௧ 
Because criticality is reached in fieldݔat time t, this is also the time that basic research starts in 
field x. In accordance with (10) the threshold moves to x after the cumulative amount of basic 
research in this field has reached the value x. Let this be at time ݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ǤThen the value of ߬ҧ௫ is 
determined by the basic research production function (11) and the allocation of the basic research 
work force. For the joint production model we obtain: 
(30) ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ݒሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ ܤ௫ሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ ׬ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁௡௭݁ఏሺ௭ି௧ሻሻభೖ݀ݖ௧ାఛതೣ௧  
Total factor productivity then is (cf. 5): 
(31) ܣሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ ௞௞ିଵݒሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ 
In the appendix we derive a more convenient growth rate version of (30): 
(32) ሺ݃௫ ൅ ఏ௞ሻݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁௡௧ሻభೖሼቀͳ ൅ ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ቁ ݁೙శഇೖ ఛതೣ െ ͳሽ  
If ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛೣ is the growth rate of A at ݐ ൅ ߬௫, (31) and the left hand side of (30) lead to: 
(33) ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ቀͳ ൅ ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ቁ ൌ ݃௫ 
Together with equations (13)-(15) and (28), equations (33) and (33) give a complete description 
of the growth dynamics of the economy. The two new equations show that the model has a 
feature that is unusual in neoclassical growth theory: the role of time. In most growth models, the 
whole future of the system is completely determined by the current values of stocks and flows. Of 
course stocks are the cumulated results of past flows, but other than that there is no influence of 
history in the system. In our model, however, there is another role of time: there is a variable lag, 
like an incubation or gestation period, between the time that critical experimental mass is 
achieved at a technology point and the moment that this point becomes the determinant of factor 
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productivity. This means that history matters: the future depends on both the current states of the 
variables and on the historical path of the critical point. The most prominent growth models that 
shared this feature to some extent are the vintage models of the nineteen seventies which had 
some promise of providing an endogenous explanation of technological progress but have fallen 
into disuse, probably because they are cumbersome and focus too much on the embodiment of 
technological progress in capital goods.  
The length of the incubation period is endogenous. This is what makes steady growth 
possible in our model. Just as in the preceding section, the critical technology point advances ever 
more rapidly due to the growth of total factor productivity. In section 5, this ever more rapid 
advance caused an acceleration of the growth of total factor productivity and thus explosive 
growth. In the present section however, an increase in the gestation period between the moment 
that a technology point reaches criticality and the completion of basic research at that same point, 
counteracts the tendency to explosive growth, playing a role the similar to that of increasing 
product diversity in endogenous growth theories. In our case, however, the gestation period is self 
adjusting and there is no need for exogenous fine-tuning of some parameter. 
 
Steady growth with joint production 
The definition of steady growth is that (per capita) income grows at a constant rate, which we 
denote as ߛǤEquation (14) implies that the growth rates of capital K and experimental mass D 
cannot be zero if income grows and (18) that they must eventually be equal to ߛǤThen (13) 
implies ݃஺ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺߛ െ ݊ሻ. It is easy to see (cf. the appendix) that in the steady state the 
critical point equation (28) implies: 
(34) ݃௫ ൌ ሺఊି௡ሻሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽା௡௞ାଵ  
We have now found that in the steady state the growth rates of Y, K ,D, A and ݔ௖ must all be 
constant. Of course this implies that in (33) the growth rate of A at time ݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫is equal to that at 
time t. Therefore (31) implies: 
(35) 
ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ൌ ௚ೣି௚ಲ௚ಲ ൌ ఈሺఊି௡ሻା௡ሺ௞ାଵሻሺଵିఈሻሺఊି௡ሻ ؠ ߩ 
Clearly, ߩ must be positive; otherwise ߬ҧ௫would eventually be negative. This implies that implying that per capita income must grow at a strictly positive rate ሺߛ ൐ ݊ሻǤ In the appendix we 
combine (33) and (30) and find that for large enough t the existence of steady growth requires: 
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(36) ݇݃௫ െ ሺ݊ ൅ ߠሻߩ െ ݊ ൌ Ͳ  
From the three equations (34)-(36) ݃௫ and  ߩ can be eliminated; this leads to quadratic equation 
in the growth rate of per capita income. Its solution (the negative root is ruled out because it 
violates the existence condition ൐ ݊ ) is derived in the appendix: 
(38) ߛ െ ݊ ൌ ௡ାఏఈାඥሺ௡ାఏఈሻమାସ௡ሺ௡ାఏሻ௞ሺଵିఈሻሺଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽଶ௞ሺଵିఈሻሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽ  
Though this is a complicated expression some conclusions are easy to draw. Most importantly: 
there is growth even if the labor force is constant (݊ ൌ Ͳ), provided there is a positive rate of 
learning in basic research (ߠ ൐ ͲሻǤ In terms of the endogenous growth literature, this means that 
size-independent growth is possible. At the other end of the scale, even without learning in basic 
researchሺߠ ൌ Ͳሻǡ there is still per capita growth as long as the natural rate is positive. Thus there 
are two primary sources of per capita growth: labor growth and basic research.  
Some calculations show the growth rate to be a decreasing function of the power of the 
technology and basic knowledge function. A numerical illustration is given in figure 2. The 
capital elasticity of output or non-labor factor share,ߙǡis set at the 33 percent that is commonly 
derived from national accounts statistics, the natural rate is one percent and the rate of learning in 
basic research,ߠǡis five percent. The figure clearly shows that a higher power law has a negative 
effect on per capita growth and a higher rate of learning a positive one. The influence of the 
learning rate is almost linear, whereas the influence of the power of the technology function itself 
resembles a power law. The figure suggests that actual per 
 
Figure 2. Impact of the technology power and basic research learning on per capita growth 
 
capita growth is the result of two conflicting forces: the degree of difficulty of technological 
progress represented by the power݇of the technology function and the ease of the development 
33 
 
of basic knowledge, represented by the rate of learning ߠ in basic research. To illustrate this 
balance table 1 shows a set of combinations of ݇ߠ that generate the same growth rate (1.5% 
per capita), for the same values of ݊ߙ used in figure 2. 
 
Table 1 Combinations of ݇ߠ that generate 1.5 percent per capita growth ݇ ߠ (%) ݇ ߠ (%) 
1.25 0.6 4 13.0 
1.5 1.3 5 20.0 
1.75 2.1 7.5 43.3 
2 3.0 10 75.0 
2.5 5.0 12.5 115.0 
3 7.3 15 163.4 ݊ ൌ ͳΨߙ ൌ ͲǤ͵͵  
 
This table shows that at a low value of the power, e.g. Lotka’s two, a rate of learning of 3% is 
sufficient to obtain 1.5% growth; but at twice this value, 13% learning is required and above 10, 
the rate of learning has to be above one hundred percent. There are some situations where very 
high rates of learning are not implausible. One is when a field depends strongly on a technology 
or methodology where rapid progress occurs; ICT, with the sixty percent growth rate of 
computing capability of Moore’s law is a case in point, but earlier examples are the inventions of 
logarithms, which greatly improved the productivity in all fields where computations were 
essential, and calculus. Even more important is the example of genomics where sequencing 
technology is improving at a rate that surpasses even Moore’s law, in part driven by the demand 
for improvement from basic research itself. In general, though, lower rates of learning seem more 
plausible which would imply lower values of ݇Ǥ 
 
Proportional allocation of the basic research labor force 
In this section we consider the situation where the basic research labor force is completely 
specific to technology points and fully fragmented into the fields corresponding to these points. 
Then we need an allocation of the total basic research labor force to the technology points. In 
section 3 we gave a simple but consistent allocation: the labor force is allocated equally to all 
technology points where critical experimental mass has been achieved but more basic knowledge 
is needed to move the threshold. In this case the derivation is more laborious and the expression 
for the growth rate more complicated, but steady growth does exist as shown in the appendix. 
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Here we do not give the solution but only consider the difference with the case of joint 
production. This is shown in table 2 for various combinations of the parameter values.  
 
Table  2 The growth rate with joint production (J) and the ratio of the growth rate with 
proportional allocation to that with joint production (P/J) 
n 1 1 1 3 n 1 1 
 ߙ 33 33 66 33  ߙ 33 33 
 ߠ 5 10 5 5  ݇ 2.5 5 
k J P/J J P/J J P/J J P/J ߠ J P/J J P/J 
1.25 3.0 50 4.4 53 8.3 38 5.7 38 1 0.8 60 0.4 76 
1,5 2.5 56 3.6 58 6.7 44 4.8 44 2 1.0 64 0.5 79 
2 1.9 63 2.7 66 4.8 53 3.6 57 4 1.3 68 0.7 82 
2.5 1.5 69 2.1 71 3.8 60 2.9 63 5 1.5 69 0.7 82 
4 0.9 79 1.3 80 2.2 73 1.8 73 10 2.1 71 1.0 84 
5 0.7 82 1.0 84 1.7 79 1.5 78 15 2.7 72 1.3 85 
10 0.4 91 0.5 92 0.8 89 0.7 88 25 3.7 73 1.7 86 
In %, except k. 
 
The table illustrates that the growth with proportional allocation is always lower than that with 
joint production. The loss is largest at low values of k, when innovation is easiest, and becomes 
negligible at high values of k. However, at these high values of k both growth rates are relatively 
low anyway. Similarly, a high natural rate and a high factor share of capital lead to both a high 
joint production growth rate and a high loss of growth in case of proportional allocation. In 
contrast, when the rate of learning in basic research varies, though both growth rates are highest 
at high rates of learning, the relative loss by proportional allocation is strongest at low rates of 
learning. Though these results seem contradictory at first glance, they are due to the same cause. 
Both when innovation is difficult (a high k) and when the rate of learning in basic is high, the 
impact of the growth of the basic research work force on the total growth rate is small relative to 
the rate of learning in basic research. In that situation, it does not matter much that the work force 
is allocated inefficiently.   
The results with respect to proportional allocation indicate that a policy of targeting of 
basic research is not likely to be beneficial to economic growth but tends to lower it compared to 
a policy of free basic research. The loss of growth may be as much as one quarter. This 
conclusion might be reinforced if account is taken of the fact that targeted basic research is often 
targeted at sectors that are deemed to be important for society or the economy, but not at the basic 
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knowledge fields where progress is fastest. This means that targeting may well lower the 
aggregate rate of learning in basic research, further increasing the loss compared to a policy of 
free basic research. Our model indicates that the most effective growth policies are those that 
enhance the joint production character of basic research: open access of publications, data, 
software, and large research facilities; strong research institutions with intensive interaction 
between people from different disciplines; rapid dissemination of early results and reliable high 
speed communication facilities; rapid dissemination of enabling technologies; and all other 
measures that allow for rapid spread of knowledge between researchers, disciplines, and 
institutions. Of course there is nothing new about the presumption that these measures raise 
productivity in basic research, in fact is a completely traditional and orthodox position. What is 
new, however, is the conclusion that these measures may lead to a higher rate of economic 
growth and that detracting from the joint production, open character of basic research seriously 
harms economic growth in advanced countries. 
One proviso should be made with respect to this conclusion: strictly speaking our analysis 
is only valid for all advanced countries combined. In theory it is possible that individual countries 
might steal a march on the other advanced nations by targeting their basic research. To analyze 
this possibility a multi country model would be needed which analyzes both the international 
dissemination of research results and the transmission of growth through international trade.  It 
should be noted, however, that such a targeted basic research policy by individual countries is 
inherently protectionist and must be harmful to the advanced countries combined.  
  
7. Stability of  science-based growth 
In many growth models stability analysis is relatively straightforward, because the changes of the 
variables at a given time depend only on stocks and flows at same time. If at that time the stocks 
are not at their dynamic equilibrium values, flows react on the gap between current and 
equilibrium values, leading towards system equilibrium if the system is stable. In our case, 
however, the dynamics are different because of the incubation period of basic research. If the 
stocks are out of equilibrium, the flows adjust towards temporary equilibrium values, given the 
current state of technology. But this adjustment process changes the future state of technology 
(after the incubation period) and therefore the future temporary equilibrium values. In addition, 
the incubation period itself is variable. Thus there might be oscillatory or even chaotic behavior 
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in the long term even when the system would be well behaved in the shorter term. Therefore we 
cannot reduce the dynamics to a two dimensional phase diagram as in figure 1. Instead employ a 
two stage analysis. First we analyze the adjustment of the variables towards their temporary 
equilibrium values or ‘attractors’. Next we consider how these attractors move in the long term 
and approach their own equilibrium values.   
The adjustment towards the temporary equilibrium is determined by the changes in the 
growth rates of capital and the critical technology point given the current level of technological 
progress; these are given by equations (15) and (28), respectively. Substitution of (13) yields: 
(39) ሶ݃௄ ൌ ݃௄ሼ݃஺ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺ݊ െ ݃௄ሻሽ 
(40) ሶ݃௫ ൌ ݃௫ሼሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻሺ݃஺ െ ݃௫ሻ ൅ ߙ݃௄ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݊ሽ 
To simplify the analysis of the incubation period and the future rate of technological progress, we 
prove in the appendix that for large t the change in the incubation period approaches 
(41) 
ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ൌ ௞௡ାఏ ቀ݃௫ െ ௡௞ቁ 
and that the values of ݃௫ǡ ݃஺exceed௡௞. Similarly, for large t the relation between the rate of 
technological progress at ݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ and ݃௫approach: 
(42)  ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ൌ ሺ௡ାఏሻ௚ೣఏା௞௚ೣ  
Differentiate (42) with respect to time, substitute (40) into the result and replace݃௫ by the inverse 
of (42) to obtain the relation between the change in the rate of technological progress at ݐ ൅߬ҧ௫and the rates of technological progress and capital growth at ݐ: 
(43) ሶ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ښ Ͳ ՞ ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ڙ ߱ሺ݃஺ǡ ݃௄ሻ ൌ ሺ௡ାఏሻሼ௚ಲሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻ 
In the appendix we show that ߱ is positive and smaller than௡ାఏ௞ ǡ that it is an increasing function 
of ݃௄ with a decreasing slope and that it tends asymptotically to ௡ାఏ௞  at large values of ݃௄Ǥ Thus a 
phase diagram at a given value of ݃஺ǡ has the general shape given in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Phase diagram at time t for given݃஺. 
 
If the two attractors ߱ሺ݃஺ǡ ݃௞ሻand ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ would be static and the system would start in either 
quadrant I or quadrant III, the system would head directly for their intersection without crossing 
either of the attractors. Thus the movement of ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣwould be monotone. Similarly, if the 
movement of ݃஺ is monotone between a point in time and the time when the corresponding 
incubation period is finished, and if at the end of that period the system is in either quadrant I (in 
case of a downward moving݃஺ሻor in quadrant III (in case of an upward movement), the 
attractors and the variables will from that time on move monotonously in the same direction and 
converge to the steady state. If, however, the system starts out in either of quadrants II or IV, the 
attractor ߱ may be crossed and the direction of movement of ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣchanged. Since the future 
values of the attractors depend on ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ǡthe attractor will not merely move in monotonously but 
change direction. In principle, this might imply oscillatory or chaotic behavior in the long term. 
To ascertain that the system nevertheless converges to the steady growth rates, we analyze the 
changes in the minima and maxima of the attractors.  
 
݊ ൅ ߠ݇  
݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ሶ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ 
݃௞ ǡ ሶ݃௞ ݃஺ͳ െ ߙ ൅ ݊ 
I 
IV III 
II 
߱ሺ݃஺ǡ ݃௞ሻ 
          ௡௞ 
0 
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In the appendix we show that the partial derivative of ߱ with respect to ݃஺ is positive but 
that of ߱ െ ݃஺negative; moreover, ߱ is larger than ݃஺ at the minimum ݃஺ ൌ ௡௞and smaller at 
the maximum݃஺ ൌ ௡ାఏ௞ . In between, there is a line ഥ߱ ൌ ҧ݃஺where both are equal. The shape of 
the line is similar to that of ߱ሺ݃஺ǡ ݃௞ሻin figure 3 and its intersection with the attractor݃௄ ൌ௚തಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊is the steady state technological growth rate 
(44)  ො݃஺ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺߛ െ ݊ሻ,  
where ߛ is given by (38). The movement of the attractors at some timeݐis determined by the 
values of ݃஺ before the incubation period that ends atݐ. These values are constrained by the 
minimum௡௞and maximum௡ାఏ௞ of ݃஺ǤBut this means, as is clear from figure 3, that if݃௄is to the 
left of the attractor value௚ಲሺ௠௜௡ሻଵିఈ ൅ ݊, ݃௄must increase until it is at least equal to this value; 
similarly, if ݃௄is to the right of the attractor value௚ಲሺ௠௔௫ሻଵିఈ ൅ ݊, itmust decrease until it is at 
most equal to this value. This implies that if ݃஺ is below the ߱ line corresponding to ݃஺ሺ݉݅݊ሻǡ ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ must increase until is arbitrarily close to the intersection of that line with݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲሺ௠௜௡ሻଵିఈ ൅݊; and when it is above the ߱ line corresponding to ݃஺ሺ݉ܽݔሻǡ ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ must decrease until it is 
arbitrarily close to the intersection with݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲሺ௠௔௫ሻଵିఈ ൅ ݊. However, these minimum and 
maximum values of ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣare the values of ݃஺ determining the movement of the system after 
the end of the incubation period. Consequently, after some point in time, the value of ݃஺ is 
always above this minimum and below this maximum. This implies that there is a new, higher, 
minimum value for the attractor of ݃௄and a new maximum value. Thus we obtain a series of 
increasing minima and a series of decreasing maxima.  This is illustrated in figure 4 for the series 
of minima, min, 1, 2, 3, and so on. Both series converge towards the intersection of ഥ߱ with the 
attractor of ݃௄ ǡthat is to the steady state growth rates of ݃௄ and݃஺. Therefore the steady state is 
globally stable.  
This is an attractive property because it implies that the model and its steady state growth 
rate is an appropriate description of a wide range of situations. The lower left hand quadrant, III, 
may be thought to correspond with the gradual emergence of knowledge-led growth in the 
modern global economy, from the beginning of the seventeenth century in The Netherlands, 
diffused to England in the second half of the seventeenth century, to some other European 
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countries and North America in the nineteenth century and to many other countries in the 
twentieth century. On average, the adjustment process is a gradual increase in the rates of 
technological progress and capital growth towards long-term equilibrium values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Development of minimum and maximum rates of technological progress ݃஺ 
 
The upper right-hand part quadrant I can be identified with the situation after the major global 
wars, both world wars in the last century and perhaps the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth 
century. During these wars basic research continued, though perhaps at a lower level of 
resources. Therefore the basic research learning processes were not disrupted but the application 
of the results was, because the amount of resources devoted to applying research results in 
civilian production was minimized (in the Second World War the US even ceased producing any 
private motor cars at all, let alone incorporate innovations). Consequently, after these periods 
ended there was a huge backlog of unapplied basic knowledge and the growth rates of both 
technology and capital are likely to have ended up in quadrant I in all nations with an advanced 
knowledge base. In that case our model predicts a gradual monotone convergence from above to 
the steady state level. This fits in quite well with the post-war booms in the nineteen twenties and 
ഥ߱ 
4 
3 
2 
Min 
Min 2 3 4 ௚ොಲଵିఈ+n ݃௄ 
݊ ൅ ߠ݇  ݃஺ 
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the nineteen fifties and sixties; and with slower growth in the leading countries in the nineteen 
thirties and seventies. 
The upper left hand quadrant II may be identified with the temporary divergence from 
long term equilibrium that is generated by the rapid growth of large transitional countries such as 
China, and, more recently, India and Brazil. Following our transitional growth model, the double 
digit growth is driven by technological knowledge as well as the rapid integration of large labor 
forces into the modern global economy; it closes the gap between the level of the transitional 
countries’ total factor productivity and the productivity level consistent with the basic knowledge 
developed in the advanced countries. This phase is characterized by an average global rate of 
technological progress above the long term equilibrium; this means that the attractor of the 
growth rate of the global capital stock (in the sense of production equipment) rapid increases and 
that the actual rate of growth of capital is below it. In our model this situation causes temporary 
instability: there is downward influence on the future rate of technological progress from its ‘too 
high’ current global level and upward influence from the increase in the rate of capital. This may 
lead to some temporary oscillations until a monotone progression towards the more moderate 
steady state growth levels is once more established. 
In the same line of reasoning, the final quadrant IV may be thought to represent the 
temporary imbalance after a group of large transitional countries has come close to the total 
productivity level of the advanced countries. At that point their rate of growth of technological 
progress must decline sharply, to a fraction of its value during the transition; this depresses the 
average rate of technological progress of the global economy and subsequently may lower the 
attractor of capital growth so much that it falls below its current level. This means that 
simultaneously the future growth rate of technology increases and that of capital falls. This too 
may cause some temporary oscillations before a monotone progression towards the steady state is 
re-established.  
 
8. The rates of return on research spending 
Since steady state growth is globally stable, long term income effects of policy measures can be 
obtained by considering the steady state level of income. Consequently, we are now able to 
address what is perhaps the most important issue in science and innovation policy: the income 
effects of expenditure on capital investments, applied R&D and basic research, both absolute and 
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relative to each other. More precisely, we will analyze the effects of expenditure on these three 
categories on ‘net income’ or consumption: income after subtraction of the cost of investment 
and R and D. In our model, expenditure on capital outlays is determined by the rate of 
savingݏ௄ǡexpenditure on applied R&D by ݏ஽ ǤWe do not yet have a similar parameter for 
spending on basic research, since we have simply worked with a given basic research labor force. 
This is adequate for the analysis of growth rates, but now a more fully elaborated neoclassical 
model is needed. Redefine ܮas the total labor force, withܮ ൌ ܮ஻ ൅ ܮ௒, where ܮ௒is the labor 
input in non-research production. Let ݌௅be the price of labor and select units of measurement 
such that the price of output is 1. Standard neoclassical optimization leads 
to݌௅ ൌ ߲ܻ ߲ܮ௒ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙሻܻȀܮ௒Τ . Let the basic research budget be a fixed proportionݏ஻of 
income: ݌௅ܮ஻ ൌ ݏ஻ܻǤThen 
(45) ܮ஻ ൌ ௦ಳ௅ೊଵିఈ ՞ ܮ஻ ൌ ௦ಳଵିఈା௦ಳ ܮ଴݁௡௧Ǣ ܮ௒ ൌ ଵିఈଵିఈା௦ಳ ܮ଴݁௡௧ 
Following the OECD (2002) Frascati Manual on science and technology statistics we refer to ݏ஽ݏ஻as (applied and basic) “research intensities”; from a strict national accounting point of 
view, these intensities should not be based on a definition of national income as output of goods 
and servicesܻbut asܻ plus the cost of basic research; this however is of no practical importance 
since the basic research intensity is quite small. The amounts spent on capital outlays,ܷ௄ǡapplied 
R and D,ܷ஽ ǡand basic research,ܷ஻ǡnow are  ௜ܷ ൌ ݏ௜ܻሺ݅ ൌ ܭǡܦǡ ܤሻ. Consumption is output Y 
less expenditure on these two categories: 
(46) ܥ ൌ ܻ െ ܷ௄ െ ܷ஽ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݏ௄ െ ݏ஽ሻܻ   
To obtain the consumption effects of spending on capital and research we now derive (a more 
detailed derivation is given in the appendix) a set of three equations for the steady state levels of 
the key variables Y, ݔ௖ and ܣǤ First note that in the steady state capital grows at the same rate ߛ as 
income and (14) implies ܭ ൌ ܻݏ௄Ȁߛ. With this equation capital can be eliminated from the 
production function (13), replacing L byܮ௒ǣ 
(47) ܻ ൌ ܮ௒ሺ௦ఊ಼ ሻ ഀభషഀܣ భభషഀ  
In the steady state, the growth rate of the critical technology point is given by (34). Substitute this 
into the original critical point equation (7) and eliminateܦሶ using (8) and ݒ using (31): 
(48)  ሺߛ െ ݊ሻሼͳ ൅ ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻሽ ൅ ݊ ൌ  ௞௦ವఋ೎ ሺ௞ିଵ௞ ஺௫೎ሻ௞ ௒௫೎ 
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In the appendix to section 7 we gave an analytic solution of the basic research equation (30), viz. 
(A.7.1). Asymptotically this equation approaches: 
(49) ݁ఛതೣ ൌ ሾܤ଴ሺ ௦ಳଵିఈା௦ಳ ܮ଴ሻభೖ ௞௡ାఏሿ ೖ೙శഇሺݔ௖ሻ ೖ೙శഇ݁ି ೙೙శഇ௧  
As the steady state growth rate ofܣǡ ො݃஺ǡis constant,ܣሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ ܣሺ݁ఛതೣሻ௚ොಲ ǤMoreover, (30) and 
(31) implyܣሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ݇ݔ௖Ȁሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻǤWith (49) this yields 
(50) 
௞௞ିଵݔ௖ ൌ ܣሾܤ଴ሺ ௦ಳଵିఈା௦ಳ ܮ଴ሻభೖ ௞௡ାఏሿೖ೒ෝಲ೙శഇሺݔ௖ሻೖ೒ෝಲ೙శഇ݁ି೙೒ෝಲ೙శഇ௧  
From the three equations (47), (48) and (50) we can now successively eliminate ݔ௖ܣ and 
obtain a solution for Y and C. Differentiating the solution for C with respect to the rate of saving 
and the two research intensities we obtain the quasi elasticities డ஼஼డ௦೔ǤWith some arithmetic we find 
for the marginal consumption effects of expenditure on capital outlays, applied R& D and basic 
research: 
(51a) 
డ஼డ௎಼ ൌ ሺଵି௦಼ି௦ವሻమ ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܭଵି௦ವାሺଵି௦಼ି௦ವሻ௦಼ ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܭ Ǣ  ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܭ ൌ ߙ൛݊൅ߠ൅݇ʹ ො݃ܣൟݏܭሾെߙሺ݊൅ߠሻݏܭ൅݇ො݃ܣሼ݇ሺͳെߙሻ൅ͳሽሿ െ ͳͳെݏܭെݏܦ  
(51b) 
డ஼డ௎ವ ൌ ሺଵି௦಼ି௦ವሻమ ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܦଵି௦಼ାሺଵି௦಼ି௦ವሻ௦ವ ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܦ Ǣ  ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܦ ൌ ݊൅ߠെ݇ො݃ܣݏܦሾെߙሺ݊൅ߠሻݏܦ൅݇ො݃ܣሼ݇ሺͳെߙሻ൅ͳሽ െ ͳͳെݏܭെݏܦ  
(51c) 
డ஼డ௎ಳ ൌ ሺଵି௦಼ି௦ವሻ ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܤ௦ಳ ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܤାଵ Ǣ  ߲ܥܥ߲ݏܤ ൌ ሺͳെߙሻሼሺͳ൅݇ሻො݃ܣെ൫݊൅ߠ൅݇ʹ ො݃ܣ൯ݏܤሽሺͳെߙ൅ݏܤሻݏܤሾെߙሺ݊൅ߠሻ൅݇ො݃ܣሼ݇ሺͳെߙሻ൅ͳሽሿ   
Note that the steady state rate of technological progressǡ ො݃஺ǡis given by (44) and depends only on 
the familiar four parameters ߙǡ ݇ǡ ݊ǡ ߠǤSimilarly, the ‘rates of return’ in (51) depend only on 
these four parameters and on the rate of saving and the two research intensities. The values of the 
rates of return are shown in table 3 for various values of the parameters. For the rate of saving we 
use 20%, for the applied R and D intensity 1.5% and for the basic research intensity 0.5%. These 
figures are in the range of actual OECD figures if we take into account that basic research mostly 
depends on funding by governments, private non-profit institutions and university endowments 
but that a significant part of these funds is spend on applied R and D. The table shows that at the 
assumed values of the rate of saving and research intensities the marginal returns on research 
expenditure are huge, and much larger than those on physical capital. The return on applied R&D 
is at least ten times as large as that on investment in physical capital and the return on basic 
research is at least three times as large as that on applied R&D. Spending one extra dollar on  
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Table 3 The long term marginal return (increased national consumption) on extra expenditure on physical 
capital, applied R&D and basic research; various values of the technology power and the rate of  learning 
in basic research 
Technology 
power 
Basic research 
learning rate 
Per capita 
growth 
Return on    
physical capital 
Return on 
applied R and D 
Return on 
basic research ݇ ߠሺΨሻ ߛ െ ݊ሺΨሻ ߲ܥ ߲ܷ௄Τ  ߲ܥ ߲ܷ஽Τ  ߲ܥ ߲ܷ஻Τ  
1.25 5 3.0 1.6 22 98 
2.5 5 1.5 1.3 16 66 
5 5 0.7 1.0 10 38 
10 5 0.4 0.8 6 20 
2,5 1 0.8 0.8 6 60 
2.5 5 1.5 1.3 16 66 
2,5 10 2.1 1.6 21 70 
2,5 15 2.7 1.8 24 74 
Returns: increase of consumption, in monetary units, due an increase in the expenditure category of one 
monetary unit. Natural rate one percent, capital elasticity of income one third; rate of saving 20%, applied 
R&D intensity 1.5%, basic research intensity 0.5%. 
 
Table 4. Cf. table 3, various values of the rate of saving and the research intensities 
Rate of 
saving 
Return on    
physical capital 
Applied R&D 
intensity 
Return on 
applied R and D 
Basic research 
intensity 
Return on 
basic research ݏ௄ሺΨሻ ߲ܥ ߲ܷ௄Τ  ݏ஽ሺΨሻ ߲ܥ ߲ܷ஽Τ  ݏ஻ሺΨሻ ߲ܥ ߲ܷ஻Τ  
10 3.6 1 33 0.1 334 
15 2.1 1.5 22 0.33 101 
20 1.3 2 16 0.5 66 
25 0.8 2.5 13 0.75 44 
30 0.4 3 10 1 33 
Units of measurement and parameter values cf. table 3, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
applied research generates  5-25 dollars of extra consumption, one extra dollar of basic research 
generates 20-100 dollars extra consumption, with a central value of 65. Naturally, the values in 
this table depend sensitively on the rate of saving and the two research intensities. The huge 
marginal returns on research are caused by the low levels of the research intensities. This is 
shown in table 4. Clearly, the return is extremely sensitive to the value of the intensities, much 
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more sensitive than on the (uncertain) parameter values. For basic research this is illustrated in 
figure 5. The marginal consumption effect of increased spending on basic research is very high at 
a research intensity of a few tenths of a percent and then gradually decreases to more moderate 
levels. Still, even at two percent the marginal return of a further increase in spending on basic 
research is 20.  
 
Figure 5 Return on basic research as function of basic research intensity. 
 
The expressions in (51) imply that there are values of the rate of saving and the two research 
intensities that maximize steady state consumption. These ‘golden rule’ values are the values 
where the డ஼஼డ௦೔ are zero (in case ofݏ௄ݏ஽both have to set at zero simultaneously):  
Golden rule rate of saving:   ݏ௄ ൌ ߙ 
Golden rule applied R& D intensity  ݏ஽ ൌ ௡ାఏି௞௚ොಲ௡ାఏା௞మ௚ොಲ 
Golden rule basic research intensity  ݏ஻ ൌ ሺଵା௞ሻ௚ොಲ௡ାఏା௞మ௚ොಲ 
The golden rule rate of saving is valueߙthat is familiar from standard neoclassical growth 
theory. The golden values of the research intensities are quite high. For the central parameter set 
we used before, ߙ ൌ ͲǤ͵͵ǡ ݊ ൌ ͲǤͲͳǡ ݇ ൌ ʹǤͷǡ ߠ ൌ ͲǤͲͷ the golden rule values of the two 
research intensities happen to be same: about 28.5%. These values are probably due to the lack of 
an inter-temporal preference rate that is an unavoidable implication of the use of a constant rate 
of saving and constant research intensities. It may be expected that the optimal levels of the 
intensities are lower if they are set to optimize an inter-temporal welfare function. However, at 
the values of at most a few percent presently observed in the real world, the returns on increased 
research spending are so huge that a realistic rate of inter-temporal preference should not 
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significantly offset them. It is safe to conclude that rational budgetary policies in the advanced 
OECD countries require a substantial increase in spending on basic research and, to a lesser 
extent, on applied R and D. 
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Mathematical appendix 
For every section of the main text this appendix gives the mathematical derivations, if needed.  
 
Section 2, equation 4 
The expected value ܧሺ ௥ܻሻof the r-th order statistic of a sample of size m from a distribution with 
cdf F(x) and pdf f(x) is (David, 1970, p. 25):  
(A.2.1)  ܧሺ ௥ܻሻ ൌ ݉൫௠ିଵ௥ିଵ ൯׬ ݔሾܨሺݔሻሿ௥ିଵሾͳ െ ܨሺݔሻሿ௠ି௥݂ሺݔሻ݀ݔஶିஶ   
The sample maximum is the m-th order statistic. Therefore its expected valueǡ ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ǡis: 
(A.2.2)  ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ ൌ ܧሺ ௡ܻሻ݊ ׬ ݔሾܨሺݔሻሿ௠ିଵ݂ሺݔሻ݀ݔஶିஶ  
For the Pareto distribution with minimum 1 this boils down to 
(A.2.3)  ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ ൌ ܧሺ ௡ܻሻ ൌ ݉݇ ׬ ሺͳ െ ݔି௞ሻ௠ିଵݔି௞݀ݔஶଵ  
Define ݖ ൌ ݔି௞ǡ so that ݖ݀ݔ ൌ െ ଵ௞ ݖିభೖିଵ݀ݖ and 
(A.2.4)  ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ ൌ െ݉׬ ሺͳ െ ݖሻ௠ିଵݖିభೖ଴ଵ ݀ݕ ൌ ݉׬ ሺͳ െ ݖሻ௠ିଵݖିభೖଵ଴ ݀ݖ  
The integral is the beta functionܤ ቀ௞ିଵ௞ ǡ ݉ቁ; consequently:  
(A.2.4)  ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ ൌ ݉ ୻ቀೖషభೖ ቁ୻ሺ௠ሻ୻ሺೖషభೖ ା௠ሻ ൌ ݉Ǩ ୻ቀೖషభೖ ቁ୻ሺೖషభೖ ା௠ሻ ൌ ݉Ǩ ଵς ሺ௠ି௜ିభೖሻ೘షభ೔సబ ൌ ௠Ǩ௞೘ς ሺ௞௝ିଵሻ೘ೕసభ   
If the minimum is ݔ௠௜௡ǡ the expectation is given by (4a). To achieve tractability in the framework 
of a growth model, we switch to a continuous sample size. Note that (A.2.1) can be written as 
(A.2.5)   ܧ൫ ෠ܺ௠൯ ൌ  ݔ௠௜௡ ൅݉  ݇ ൅ σ  ݆௠௝ୀଵ െσ ሺ݆݇ െ ͳሻ௠௝ୀଵ   
Let ܦ ൒ ͳ be the continuous sample mass. Then the equivalent of (4.a) is 
(A.2.6)   ܧ൫ ෠ܺ൯ ൌ  ݔ௠௜௡ ൅ܦ  ݇ ൅ ׬  ݖ஽ଵ ݀ݖ െ ׬ ሺ݇ݖ െ ͳሻ஽ଵ ݀ݖ    
Note  
(A.2.7)  ׬ ሺ݇ݖ െ ͳሻ ൌ ቀݖ െ ଵ௞ቁ ሺ݇ݖ െ ͳሻ െ ݖ        
Hence: 
(A.2.8)   ܧ൫ ෠ܺ൯ ൌ  ݔ௠௜௡ ൅ܦ  ݇ ൅ ሼݖ  ݖ െ ݖሽȁଵ஽ െ ቄቀݖ െ ଵ௞ቁ ሺ݇ݖ െ ͳሻ െ ݖቅ ȁଵ஽ ൌ   
   = ݔ௠௜௡ሺ݇ െ ͳሻ ൅ ܦ  ஽௞஽௞ିଵ൅ ଵ௞  ሺ௞஽ିଵሻ௞ିଵ      
(A.2.9)  ܧ൫ ෠ܺ൯ ൌ ݔ௠௜௡ሺ݇ െ ͳሻሺ ஽௞஽௞ିଵሻ஽ሺ௞஽ିଵ௞ିଵ ሻଵ ௞Τ         
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(A.2.10) 
ௗ୪୬ாሺ௑෠ሻௗ஽ ൌ  ஽௞஽௞ିଵ ;   ௗ୪୬ாሺ௑෠ሻௗ ୪୬஽ ൌ ܦ  ஽௞஽௞ିଵ        
Consider஽՜ஶܦ  ஽௞஽௞ିଵ. Letοൌ ଵୈ ǡ ݄ሺοሻ ൌ  ௞௞ିο ݄ሺ௜ሻbe the ݅ െ  derivative of݄Ǥ 
Then a Taylor expansion of ݄ around οൌ Ͳ with Lagrange’s remainder term yields݄ሺοሻ ൌ ο௞ ൅οమଶሺ௞ିஞሻమ  (Ͳ ൏ Ɍ ൏ οǢο՜଴ Ɍ ൌ Ͳ). Thus  
(A.2.11)  ஽՜ஶሼܦ  ஽௞஽௞ିଵሽ ൌ ଵ௞  
(A.2.12) ஽՜ஶ ܧ൫ ෠ܺ൯ ൌ ݔ௠௜௡ሼሺ݇ െ ͳሻ௞ିଵ݁݇ܦሽభೖ;  ௗ୪୬ாሺ௑෠ሻௗ ୪୬஽ ൌ ଵ௞ 
Section2, equation 7 
A necessary condition for the threshold to increase beyond any value of ݔ is that critical density 
is achieved there. Before the moment ݐ଴ ൐ Ͳ when the critical density is reached at ݔ௠௜௡ (that 
isߜሺݔ௠௜௡ǡ ݐ଴ሻ ൌ ߜ௖) the threshold is atݔ௠௜௡ܨ൫ݒሺݐሻ൯ ൌ ܨሺݔ௠௜௡ሻ ൌ Ͳ. Consequently we 
obtain from the right hand part of (6) for ݐ ൑ ݐ଴ 
(A.2.13) ܦሺݐ଴ሻ ൌ ఋ೎௙ሺ௫೘೔೙ሻ  
Provided ܦ increases with time, the left hand part of (6) implies that the density increases 
monotonously at all values of  ݔ; the right hand part implies that at any given time, the density 
decreases with ݔ, since݂ሺݔሻ is a decreasing function. Consequently, at any moment there is only 
one value of ݔǡ denoted by ݔ௖ሺݐሻǡwhereߜሺݔ௖ሺݐሻሻ ൌ ߜ௖. Suppose the threshold remains at ݔ௠௜௡ 
until ݐଵ ൒ ݐ଴ and let ܦሺͲሻ be negligible. Then the right-hand part of (6) can be written as: 
 (A.2.14) ߜሺݔǡ ݐሻ ൌ ݂ሺݔሻܦሺݐଵሻ ൅ ׬ ௙ሺ௫ሻଵିி൫௩ሺ௭ሻ൯ డ஽ሺ௭ሻడ௭ ݀ݖ௧௧భ    
Insert ݔ ൌ ݔ௖ሺݐሻ and differentiate with respect to time:    
(A.2.15) ߜ௖ ൌ ߜሺݔ௖ሺݐሻሻ ൌ ݂ሺݔ௖ሺݐሻሻܦሺݐଵሻ ൅ ݂ሺݔ௖ሺݐሻሻ ׬ ଵଵିி൫௩ሺ௭ሻ൯ డ஽ሺ௭ሻడ௭ ݀ݖ௧௧భ    
(A.2.16) Ͳ ൌ ܦሺݐଵሻ ௗ௙ሺ௫೎ሺ௧ሻሻௗ௧ ൅ ௗ௙ሺ௫೎ሺ௧ሻሻௗ௧ ׬ ଵଵିிሺ௩ሺ௭ሻሻ௧௧భ డ஽ሺ௭ሻడ௭ ݀ݖ ൅ ௙൫௫೎ሺ௧ሻ൯ଵିி൫௩ሺ௧ሻ൯ܦሶ     
Using (A.2.14) to eliminate the integral from (A.2.16) we obtain: 
(A.2.17)  
ௗ௙ሺ௫೎ሺ௧ሻሻௗ௧ ൌ ௗ௙൫௫೎ሺ௧ሻ൯ௗ൫௫೎ሺ௧ሻ൯ ௗ௫೎ሺ௧ሻௗ௧ ൌ െ ଵఋ೎  ௙మ൫௫೎ሺ௧ሻ൯ଵିிሺ௩ሺ௧ሻሻܦሶ  
From this (7) is obtained by using the Pareto function (2).  
 
Section 3, equation 11 
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Let ܧ൫ܪ෡ǡ ߬൯ be the expected maximum of a sample of hypotheses ݄ in the sample mass in fieldݔ. 
We omit the field subscript. The conditional distribution at time߬of any sample above some 
value of ݄ is independent of the value of the threshold at the time that the original sample was 
drawn. Therefore we can apply the equivalent of (A.2.9): 
(A3.1) ܧ൫ܪ෡ǡ ߬൯ ൎ ݒሺ߬ሻሼሺ݇ െ ͳሻ௞ିଵ݇݁ܦሺ߬ሻሽభೖ  
Here ܦሺ߬ሻ andݒሺ߬ሻare, respectively, the cumulative sample size and threshold at time߬Ǥ The 
change in the sample mass is 
(A.3.2)   
ௗ஽ሺఛሻௗఛ ൌ ܮ െడ஽ሺఛሻడ௩ሺఛሻ ௗ௩ሺఛሻௗఛ ൌ ܮ െ ݃൫ݒሺ߬ሻȁ݄ ൒ ݒሺ߬ሻ൯ܦሺ߬ሻ ௗ௩ሺఛሻௗఛ ൌ ܮ െ ݇ߠܦሺ߬ሻ  
Now consider the case where the labor force grows exponentially:ܮ ൌ ܮ଴݁௡ఛ. Then the solution 
of the differential equation (A.3.2) is: 
(A.3.3)  ܦሺ߬ሻ ൌ ௅బ௡ା௞ఏ ݁௡ఛ ൅ ݁ି௞ఏఛ  
Substituting this into (A.3.2) yields, for large enough߬: 
(A.3.4)  ܧ൫ܪ෡ǡ ߬൯ ൌ ݒሺ߬ሻሼሺ݇ െ ͳሻ௞ିଵ ௞௡ା௞ఏ ݁ሽభೖܮభೖ  
Thus we can write 
(A.3.5)  
ௗாሺு෡ǡఛሻௗఛ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ݁ఏఛሻభೖǡ ܤ଴ ൌ ఏା௡௞ ݄௠௜௡ሼሺ݇ െ ͳሻ௞ିଵ ௞௡ା௞ఏ ݁ሽభೖ 
Section 6, equation 32 
First note that we can write (30) as 
(A.6.1)  ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁ିఏ௧ሻభೖ ׬ ݁೙శഇೖ ௭݀ݖ௧ାఛതೣ௧  
This equation can be solved analytically, but we use a different derivation that is also applicable 
in the case of proportional allocation where an analytical solution is not available. Differentiate 
(30) with respect to t using the standard formula for differentiating an integral (Courant, 1936, p. 
220) and next substitute ݔ௖ሺݐሻ for the right hand side of (30): 
(A.6.2)  
ௗ௫೎ሺ௧ሻௗ௧ ൌ ିఏ௞ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁ିఏ௧ሻభೖ ׬ ݁೙షഇೖ ௭݀ݖ௧ାఛതೣ௧ ൅ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁ିఏ௧ሻభೖ ൜െ݁೙శഇೖ ௧ ൅ ቀͳ ൅ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ቁ ݁೙శഇೖ ሺ௧ାఛതೣሻቅ 
(A.6.3)  
ௗ௫೎ሺ௧ሻௗ௧ ൌ ିఏ௞ ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൅ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁௡௧ሻభೖሼቀͳ ൅ ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ቁ ݁೙శഇೖ ఛതೣ െ ͳሽ  
Substitute 
ௗ௫೎ሺ௧ሻௗ௧ ൌ ݔ௖ሺݐሻ݃௫ to obtain (32).  
Section 6 Equation 34 
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Since ݃஺ ൌ ݃௩ǡthe critical point equation (28) yields  
(A.6.4)  ሶ݃௫ ൌ ݃௫ሼ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻሺߛ െ ݊ሻ െ ሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻ݃௫ ൅ ߛሽ and in the steady state  
(A.6.5)  ሶ݃௫ ښ Ͳ ՞ ݃௫ ڙ ሺఊି௡ሻሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽା௡௞ାଵ  
This implies that in the steady state ௧՜∞ ݃௫is given by (34).Note that this is independent of the 
assumptions about the allocation of the basic research labor force. 
Section 6, equation 36 and 37 
Differential equation (33) can be solved to obtain 
(A.6.6)  ߬ҧ௫ሺݐሻ ൌ ߬ҧ௫ሺݐ଴ሻ ൅ ߩሺݐെݐ଴ሻ or  ߬ҧ௫ ൌ ߬ҧ଴ ൅ ߩݐ 
Here ݐ଴is a value of t where the steady state exists and߬ҧ଴ ؠ ߬ҧ௫ሺݐ଴ሻ െ ߩݐ଴. Since ݃௫ is constant 
we can write ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ݔ௖଴݁௚ೣ௧in the steady state. Therefore, using (35) and (A.6.6) we obtain 
from (32) for the steady state: 
(A.6.7)  ቀ݃௫ ൅ ఏ௞ቁ ݔ௖଴݁௚ೣ௧ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁௡௧ሻభೖ ൜ሺͳ ൅ ߩሻ݁೙శഇೖ ሺఛതబାఘ௧ሻ െ ͳൠ  
Since ߩ is positive, the term minus one between curly brackets vanishes for large t and (A.6.7) 
implies: 
(A.6.8)  ݁ሼ೙శഇೖ ఘା೙ೖି௚ೣሽ௧ ൌ ቀ݃௫ ൅ ఏ௞ቁ ௫೎బ஻బሺଵାఘሻܮ஻଴ିభೖ݁ି೙శഇೖ ఛതబ 
Since the right hand side is constant, this equation can only be satisfied if the exponent in the left 
hand side is zero, implying (36). Substitution of (34) and (35) in (36) now yields a quadratic 
equation inߛ െ ݊: 
(A.6.9)  ሺߛ െ ݊ሻଶ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻሼͳ ൅ ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻሽ െ ሺߛ െ ݊ሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠߙሻ െ ݊ሺ݊ ൅ ߠሻ ൌ Ͳ 
The solution of this equation is (37). The negative root can be omitted: it leads to a negative value 
of ߛ െ ݊ and is therefore, as shown above, inconsistent with steady growth. The derivatives of 
this growth rate are: 
(A.6.10)  
ௗሺఊି௡ሻௗ௞ ൌ െ ሺ௡ାఈఏሻሺఊାఈఏሻሼଵାଶ௞ሺଵିఈሻሽ௞ሺଵିఈሻሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽ  
Section 6 Proportional allocation.  
In case of proportional allocation, (30) is replaced by 
(30b)  ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ݒሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ ܤ௫ሺݐ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ ׬ ܤ଴ ቀ ௅ಳబ௘೙೥௫೎ሺ௭ሻି௩ሺ௭ሻ ݁ఏሺ௭ି௧ሻቁభೖ ݀ݖ௧ାఛതೣ௧     
Instead of (A.6.1) we obtain: 
(A.6.1a)  ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁ିఏ௧ሻభೖ ׬ ሺ ௘ሺ೙శഇሻ೥௫೎ሺ௭ሻି௩ሺ௭ሻሻభೖ݀ݖ௧ାఛതೣ௧  
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Differentiation with respect to t and substitution into the result of ݔ௖ሺݐሻ for the expression equal 
to the right hand side of (A.6.1a) yields 
(32b)  ቀ݃௫ ൅ ఏ௞ቁ ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁௡௧ሻభೖሼቀͳ ൅ ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ቁ ሺ ௘ሺ೙శഇሻഓതೣ௫೎ሺ௧ାఛതೣሻି௩ሺ௧ାఛതೣሻሻభೖ െ ሺ ଵ௫೎ሺ௧ሻି௩ሺ௧ሻሻభೖሽ 
Equations (30), (33)-(35) and (A.6.4) are unchanged from joint production. In the steady state ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ݔ௖଴݁௚ೣ௧Ǥ As߬ҧ௫ ൌ ߬ҧ଴ ൅ ߩݐ, we have ݔ௖ሺݐ ൅ ߬௫ሻ ൌ ݔ௖଴݁௚ೣሺఛതబାఘ௧ା௧ሻǤ Moreover,ݒሺݐ ൅߬ҧ௫ሻ ൌ ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ݔ௖଴݁௚ೣ௧ǤTo obtain ݒሺݐሻǡ define ݐଵso thatݐ ൌ ݐଵ ൅ ߬ҧ௫ሺݐଵሻ ൌ ߬ҧ଴ ൅ ሺߩ ൅ ͳሻݐଵ, 
orݐଵ ൌ ௧ିఛതబଵାఘ . Thus ݒሺݐሻ ൌ ݔ௖ሺݐଵሻ ൌ ݔ௖଴݁௚ೣ೟షഓതబభశഐ . The equivalent of (A.6.7) now is: 
 (A.6.7a) ቀ݃௫ ൅ ఏ௞ቁ ሺݔ௖଴݁௚ೣ௧ሻೖశభೖ ൌ ܤ଴ሺܮ஻଴݁௡௧ሻభೖሼሺͳ ൅ ߩሻሺ௘ሺ೙శഇష೒ೣሻሺഓതబశഐ೟ሻଵି௘ష೒ೣሺഓതబశഐ೟ሻ ሻభೖ െ ሺ ଵଵି௘ష೒ೣ೟ഐశഓതబభశഐ ሻభೖሽ   
Since ߩand݃௫are positive, the denominators of the terms of the expression between curly 
brackets approach 1 for large t and thus the expression itself approaches ሺͳ ൅ߩሻ݁ሼ೙శഇೖ ି௚ೣሽሺఛതబାఘ௧ሻǤTherefore steady growth requires ݃௫ ௞ାଵ௞ ൌ ௡௞ ൅ ఘ௞ ሼ݊ ൅ ߠ െ ݃௫ሽand the 
equivalent of (36) is 
(36a)  ݃௫ሺߩ ൅ ݇ ൅ ͳሻ െ ݊ሺߩ ൅ ͳሻ െ ߠߩ ൌ Ͳ  
Substitute (34) and (35) into (36a): 
 (A.6.9a) ሺߛ െ ݊ሻଶ ሼͳ ൅ ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻሽሼͳ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݇ሺ݇ ൅ ʹሻሽ ൅ ሺߛ െ ݊ሻሾ݊݇ሺͳ െ ʹߙሻ ൅ ݊ െߠߙሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻሿ െ ݊ሼ݊݇ ൅ ߠሺ݇ ൅ ͳሻሽ ൌ Ͳ 
(38a) ߛ െ ݊ ൌ ି௡௞ሺଵିଶఈሻି௡ାఏሺ௞ାଵሻఈାඥሺ௡௞ሺଵିଶఈሻି௡ାఏሺ௞ାଵሻఈሻమାସ௡ሼ௡௞ାఏሺ௞ାଵሻሽሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽሼଵାሺଵିఈሻ௞ሺ௞ାଶሻሽଶሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽሼଵାሺଵିఈሻ௞ሺ௞ାଶሻሽ   
Section 7, equations 41 and 42 
In the case of steady growth analysis, we differentiated equation (Ǥ ͸Ǥͳሻ; for stability analysis it 
is more convenient to solve it directly and then differentiate the solution:  
 (A.7.1)  ݔ௖ሺݐሻ ൌ ܤ଴ܮ஻଴భೖ  ௞௡ାఏ ݁೙ೖ௧ሺ݁೙శഇೖ ఛതೣ െ ͳሻ 
(A.7.2)  ݃௫ ൌ ௡௞ ൅ ௡ାఏ௞ ௘೙శഇೖ ഓതೣ௘೙శഇೖ ഓതೣିଵ ௗఛതೣௗ௧  
Thus  
(A.7.3)  
ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ൌ ௞௡ାఏ ቀ݃௫ െ ௡௞ቁ ሺͳ െ ߤሻ, ߤ ൌ ݁ି೙శഇೖ ఛതೣ  (Ͳ ൏ ߤ ൏ ͳሻ 
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Clearly, if ݃௫ ൐ ௡௞ for all ݐ above some value, ߬ҧ௫keeps on increasing and௧՜∞ ߤ ൌ Ͳ. In that 
case we can write: 
(A.7.4)  
ௗఛതೣௗ௧ ൌ ௞௡ାఏ ቀ݃௫ െ ௡௞ቁ ൅ οǢ ௧՜∞ ο ൌ Ͳ 
Using this equation and (33) the asymptotic relation (42) between ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣand ݃௫is obtained. It 
remains to prove that ݃௫ ൐ ௡௞ is indeed satisfied above some value of t. First note that (39) implies 
(A.7.5)  ሶ݃௄ ൐ Ͳ if ݃௄ ൏ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ and ݃௄ ൒ ݊ െ οǡ ௧՜∞ ο ൑ Ͳ  
Note that we use the same ο as in (A.7.4). This is valid here as well as in the next few equations 
since ο is just a remainder term that is arbitrarily small if t is chosen sufficiently large. Now (40) 
implies  
(A.7.6)  ሶ݃௫ ൒ ݃௫ሼെሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻ݃௫ ൅ ݊ െ οሽ and ݃௫ ൒ ௡ଵା௞ െ ο 
Thus after some time, ݃௄and݃௫have minimum values close to ݊ ௡௞ାଵǡrespectively. Next, 
substitute (A.7.3) in (33): 
(A.7.7)  ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ൌ ௚ೣሺ௡ାఏሻఏା௞௚ೣାఓሺ௡ି௞௚ೣሻ    ݃௫ ൌ ሺఏାఓ௡ሻ௚ಲǡ೟శഓതೣ௡ାఏି௞ሺଵିఓሻ௚ಲǡ೟శഓതೣ 
Note that the denominator of ݃௫must be non negative, since ݃௫is non-negative. This requires 
(A.7.8)   ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ൑ ௡ାఏ௞ሺଵିఓሻ 
Moreover, substituting the extreme right hand side of (A.7.7) into݃௫ ൒ ௡ଵା௞ െ ο, we obtain after 
some reshuffling݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ൒ ሾ݊ െ οଷሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻሿȀሾ݇ ൅ ఏାఓ௡ఏା௡ െ οଷ ሺଵା௞ሻ௞ሺଵିఓሻఏା௡ ሿ. Since ఏାఓ௡ఏା௡ ൑ ͳ this 
implies ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ൒ ௡ଵା௞ െ οǤ Consequently, from some time on, the value of ݃஺satisfies (A.7.9). 
Applying reasoning similar to that in (A.7.5) we now obtain after some point in time: 
(A.7.10) ݃௄ ൒ ௡ሺଵିఈሻሺଵା௞ሻ ൅ ݊ െ ο 
Now (40) implies ሶ݃௫ ൒ ݃௫ ቄ݊ሼʹ ൅ ఈ௡ሺଵିఈሻሺଵା௞ሻሽ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻ݃௫ െ οቅ. Because݇ ൒ ͳwe have  ௡ଵା௞ ቄʹ ൅ ఈ௡ሺଵିఈሻሺଵା௞ሻቅ ൒ ௡௞ ൅ ఈ௡ሺଵିఈሻሺଵା௞ሻమ. Therefore (A.7.11) implies݃௫ ൒ ௡௞ ൅ ఈ௡ሺଵିఈሻሺଵା௞ሻమ െ ο. As ο is arbitrarily close to zero if t is large enough, this implies that after some point in time ݃௫is 
indeed strictly larger than௡௞. 
Section 7 Equation (43) and figure 3 
Differentiate (42) with respect to time: 
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 (A.7.11)  ሶ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ൌ ఏ௚ሶೣሾఏା௞௚ೣሿమ ൌ ఏ௚ೣሼሺଵା௞ሻሺ௚ಲି௚ೣሻାఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽሾఏା௞௚ೣሿమ  
Use (42) to write ݃௫as a function of݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ: 
(A.7.12) ݃௫ ൌ ఏ௚ಲǡ೟శഓതೣ௡ାఏି௞௚ಲǡ೟శഓതೣ  (݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ൑ ௡ାఏ௞  is implied by ݃௫ ൒ Ͳሻ 
Substitute this into (A.7.11): 
(A.7.13) 
௚ሶಲǡ೟శഓതೣ௚ಲǡ೟శഓതೣ ൌ ି௚ಲǡ೟శഓതೣሾሺଵା௞ሻఏା௞ሺଵା௞ሻ௚ಲାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ሿାሼ௡ାఏሽሼሺଵା௞ሻ௚ಲାఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽሾ௡ାఏሿమ   
This implies 
(A.7.14) ሶ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ښ Ͳ ՞ ݃஺ǡ௧ାఛതೣ ڙ ሺ௡ାఏሻሼ௚ಲሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻ ൌ ߱ሺ݃஺ǡ ݃௄ሻ 
 
In order to sketch the phase diagram in figure 3 we need to derive the properties of߱. First note 
that ߱is positive for all values of݃஺ǡ ݃௄ǤMoreover, it is smaller than௡ାఏ௞ ǣ  
(A.7.15) ߱ െ ௡ାఏ௞ ൌ ௡ାఏ௞  ିఏሺଵା௞ሻ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻ ൏ Ͳ  
This equation immediately implies ௚಼՜∞߱ ൌ ௡ାఏ௞ . Next consider the partial derivative to ݃௄ 
(A.7.16) 
డఠడ௚಼ ൌ ఏሺଵା௞ሻሺ௡ାఏሻఈሾ௞ሼ௚ಲሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽାఏሺଵା௞ሻሿమ  
This is positive and decreases as ݃௄increases. Furthermore 
(A.7.17) ߱ሺ݃௄ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌ ሺ௡ାఏሻሼ௚ಲሺଵା௞ሻାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽ௞ሼ௚ಲሺଵା௞ሻାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽାఏሺଵା௞ሻ ൐ Ͳ  
(A.7.18) ߱ ቀ݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ቁ ൌ ሺ௡ାఏሻሼ௚ಲሺଵା௞ି௞ఈሻା௡ሺଵିఈሻሽ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ି௞ఈሻା௞௡ሺଵିఈሻାఏሺଵା௞ሻሺଵିఈሻ  
This allows the sketch of the short term phase diagram, for given݃஺ǡin Figure 3.  
Section 7, Figure 4 
We first give a number of properties of߱ as a function of ݃஺ and then derive figure 4.  
 (A.7.19) 
డఠడ௚ಲ ൌ ሺ௡ାఏሻఏሺଵା௞ሻమሾ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻሿమ ൐ Ͳ  
Thus ߱ is an increasing function of݃஺. The difference between ߱ and ݃஺is 
(A.7.20) ߱ െ ݃஺ ൌ ି௚ಲమ௞ሺଵା௞ሻା௚ಲሾ௡ିఈ௞௚಼ାఈ௞௡ሿାሺ௡ାఏሻሼఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻ  
The partial derivative of this function with respect to ݃஺is 
(A.7.21)  
డሺఠି௚ಲሻడ௚ಲ ൌ ሺ௡ାఏሻఏሺଵା௞ሻమିሾ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻሿమሾ௚ಲ௞ሺଵା௞ሻାఈ௞௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻሿమ   
The sign of this derivative is the sign of   
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(A.7.22) ሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻඥሺ݊ ൅ ߠሻߠ െ ݃஺݇ሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻ െ ߙ݇݃௄ െ ሺͳ െ ߙሻ݇݊ െ ߠሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻ 
At the minimum of ݃஺ǡ ௡௞ǡthis expression has the value 
(A.7.23) ሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻඥሺ݊ ൅ ߠሻሼξߠ െ ඥሺ݊ ൅ ߠሻሽ െ ݊݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻ െ ߙ݇݃௄ ൏ Ͳ 
Thus ߱ െ ݃஺is a strictly decreasing function of݃஺. The value of ߱ െ ݃஺ is zero at  
(A.7.24) ഥ߱ ൌ ҧ݃஺ ൌ ሾ௡ିఈ௞௚಼ାఈ௞௡ሿାඥሾ௡ିఈ௞௚಼ାఈ௞௡ሿమାସ௞ሺଵା௞ሻሺ௡ାఏሻሼఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽଶ௞ሺଵା௞ሻ  
With respect to the sign of ߱ െ ݃஺ we now have 
(A.7.25) ߱ሺ݃஺ǡ ݃௄ሻ െ ݃஺ ښ Ͳ ՞ ݃஺ ڙ ҧ݃஺ሺ݃௄ሻ 
The intersection of the numerator of ߱ െ ݃஺ with ݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ is 
(A.7.26) ߱ሺ݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ሻ െ ݃஺ ൌ ି௚ಲమ௞ሾଵା௞ିఈ௞ሿା௚ಲሾ௡ାఏఈሿାሺ௡ାఏሻ௡ሺଵିఈሻ௚ಲሾଵା௞ିఈ௞ሿାሺଵିఈሻሼ௞௡ାఏሺଵା௞ሻሽ  
This is zero if 
(A.7.27) ݃஺ଶ݇ሼͳ ൅ ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻሽ െ ݃஺ሺ݊ ൅ ߠߙሻ െ ݊ሺ݊ ൅ ߠሻሺͳ െ ߙሻ ൌ Ͳ 
(A.7.28) ො݃஺ ൌ ௡ାఏఈାඥሺ௡ାఏఈሻమାସ௞ሼଵା௞ሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽ௡ሺ௡ାఏሻሺଵିఈሻሽଶ௞ሼଵା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽ   
In agreement with the steady state growth rate of per capita incomeߛ െ ݊ in (30), we findߛ െ݊ ൌ ௚ොಲଵିఈ. The value of ߱ െ ݃஺ at the maximum of݃஺is 
(A.7.29) ߱ െ ݃஺ሺ݃஺ ൌ ௡ାఏ௞ ሻ ൌ ௡ାఏ௞ ିఏሺଵା௞ሻఈ௞௚಼ା௡ሼଵାଶ௞ିఈ௞ሽାଶఏሺଵା௞ሻ 
At ݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ ൌ ௡ାఏ௞ሺଵିఈሻ൅ ݊ this becomes 
(A.7.30) ߱ െ ݃஺ሺ݃஺ ൌ ௡ାఏ௞ Ǣ ݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ሻ ൌ ଵ௞ ିఏሺଵା௞ሻሺଵିఈሻሺ௡ାఏሻሺ௡ାఏሻሼଵାଶ௞ሺଵିఈሻሽାఏሺଵିఈሻ 
The value of ߱ െ ݃஺at the minimum of݃஺is 
(A.7.31) ߱ െ ݃஺ ቀ݃஺ ൌ ௡௞ቁ ൌ ఏሼఈ௚಼ାሺଵିఈሻ௡ሽఈ௞௚಼ା௡ሼଵାଶ௞ିఈ௞ሽାఏሺଵା௞ሻ 
At ݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ ൌ ௡௞ሺଵିఈሻ൅ ݊ this becomes 
(A.7.32) ߱ െ ݃஺ ቀ݃஺ ൌ ௡௞ Ǣ ݃௄ ൌ ௚ಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ቁ ൌ ఏ௡ሼఈା௞ሺଵିఈሻሽ௞௡ሼଵାଶ௞ሺଵିఈሻሽାఏሺଵା௞ሻ௞ሺଵିఈሻ 
The progression of minima and maxima explained in the main text is now easily derived. From 
some time ݐ଴כ on, the lowest possible value of ݃஺ is ௡௞ǤDenote this minimum as݃஺ǡଵ and let the 
moment from which this minimum is first achieved The corresponding attractor of ݃௄ is݃௄ǡଵ ൌ௚ಲ೘೔೙ǡభଵିఈ ൅ ݊. If ݃஺ is at this minimum there is, irrespective of the initial value of ݃௄ǡaݐଵsuch that 
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for all ݐ ൒ ݐଵ the value of ݃௄exceeds ݃௄ǡଵ െ οሺο൐ Ͳሻǡwhere ο can be chosen arbitrarily small 
by selecting ݐଵ large enough. This implies߱ ൐ ߱൫݃஺ ൌ ݃஺௠௜௡ǡଵǡ ݃௄ ൌ ݃௄ǡଵ െ ο൯ ൌ߱ଵݐ ൒ ݐଵ. Thus there is a ݐଵכ ൒ ݐଵsuch that (cf. figure A2) ݃஺ ൐ ߱ଵ െ οൌ ݃஺௠௜௡ǡଶ ൐݃஺௠௜௡ǡଵ for all ݐ ൒ ݐଵכǤ  
 
Continuing the same process we obtain (the ο′ݏ can be omitted because in the next step they 
become superfluous) a sequence ݐ௜כ ൒ ݐ௜ ൒ ݐ௜ିଵכ ǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ǥ such that  
· ݃஺ ൐ ݃஺௠௜௡ǡ௜ for ݐ ൒ ݐ௜ିଵכ  
· ݃௄ ൐ ݃௄ǡ௜ ൌ ௚ಲ೘೔೙ǡ೔ଵିఈ ൅ ݊ݐ ൒ ݐ௜ 
· ݃஺ ൐ ݃஺௠௜௡ǡ௜ାଵ ൌ ߱௜ ൌ ߱൫݃஺ ൌ ݃஺௠௜௡ǡ௜ǡ ݃௄ ൌ ݃௄ǡ௜൯ for ݐ ൒ ݐ௜כ 
Since݃஺௠௜௡ǡ௜ାଵ ൐ ݃஺௠௜௡ǡ௜as long as߱௜ ൏ ഥ߱ǡthe sequence݃஺௠௜௡ǡ௜converges to ഥ߱ ቀ݃஺ ൌො݃஺Ǣ ݃௄ǡ௜ ൌ ௚ොಲଵିఈ ൅ ݊ቁ ൌ ො݃஺. The reasoning for the maximum values of ݃஺ and݃௄ǡis analogous, 
mutatis mutandis. 
Section 8 
The solution for Y that can be computed from (47), (48) and (50) is 
(A.8.1)  ܻ ൌ ሼ ௞௞ିଵܮ௒ଵିఈ ቀ௦ఊ಼ ሻఈቅሺೖమ೒ෝಲశ೙శഇሻ഑ ሺଵା௞௚ොೣ ௞௦ವఋ೎ ሻ೙శഇషೖ೒ෝಲ഑ ሺ߯௞݁௡௧ሻሺೖశభሻ೒ෝಲ഑  
Here  ߪ ൌ െߙሺ݊ ൅ ߠሻ ൅ ݇ ො݃஺ሼ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻ ൅ ͳሽ  
  ො݃஺ ൌ ሺߛ െ ݊ሻሺͳ െ ߙሻ  
  
௚ොೣଵା௞ ൌ ሺߛ െ ݊ሻሼͳ ൅ ݇ሺͳ െ ߙሻሽ ൅ ݊  
 ߯ ൌ ܤ଴ሺ ௦ಳଵିఈା௦ಳ ܮ଴ሻభೖ ௞௡ାఏ 
The marginal consumption effect of capital outlays and the two categories of research 
expenditure can be obtained by differentiating Y with respect to the ݏ௜ first, next derive the quasi 
elasticities of C with respect to the ݏ௜ǡwhich are interesting in their own right, and finally replace 
the changes in e ݀ݏ௜by the appropriate expressions in ݀ ௜ܷ.  
 
Thus the first step is to differentiate (A.8.1) with respect to ݏ௄ǡ ݏ஽ ǡ ܮ௒ǡ ߯Ǥ 
(A.8.2)   
ௗ௒௒ ൌ ௡ାఏା௞మ௚ොಲఙ ሼሺͳ െ ߙሻ ௗ௅ೊ௅ೊ ൅ ߙ ௗ௦಼௦಼ ሽ ൅ ௡ାఏି௞௚ොಲఙ ௗ௦ವ௦ವ ൅ ሺଵା௞ሻ௞௚ොಲఙ ௗఞఞ   
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Express ݀߯ and ݀ܮ௒ in ݀ݏ஻ (use 45 in case of ܮ௒ሻǣ 
(A.8.3)  
ௗఞఞ ൌ ଵ௞ ଵିఈଵିఈା௦ಳ ௗ௦ಳ௦ಳ ;  ௗ௅ೊ௅ೊ ൌ ି௦ಳଵିఈା௦ಳ ௗ௦ಳ௦ಳ  
Consequently: 
(A.8.4)     
ௗ௒௒ ൌ ௡ାఏା௞మ௚ොಲఙ ߙ ௗ௦಼௦಼ ൅ ௡ାఏି௞௚ොಲఙ ௗ௦ವ௦ವ ൅ ௗ௦ಳ௦ಳ ሺଵିఈሻఙሺଵିఈା௦ಳሻ ሾሺͳ ൅ ݇ሻ ො݃஺ െ ݏ஻ሼ݊ ൅ ߠ ൅ ݇ଶ ො݃஺ሽሿ 
Next use (46) to obtain ݀ܥǣ 
(A.8.5)   
ௗ஼஼ ൌ ௗ௒௒ െ ௦ವଵି௦಼ି௦ವ ௗ௦ವ௦ವ െ ௦಼ଵି௦಼ି௦ವ ௗ௦಼௦಼ ൌ ቂఈ൛௡ାఏା௞మ௚ොಲൟఙ௦಼ െ ଵଵି௦಼ି௦ವቃ ݀ݏ௄ ൅ 
        ቂሼ௡ାఏି௞௚ොಲሽఙ௦ವ െ ଵଵି௦಼ି௦ವቃ ݀ݏ஽ ൅ ݀ݏ஻ ሺଵିఈሻఙሺଵିఈା௦ಳሻ ሾሺଵା௞ሻ௚ොಲ௦ಳ െ ሼ݊ ൅ ߠ ൅ ݇ଶ ො݃஺ሽሿ 
The quasi elasticities in (51) are taken from (A.8.5). To obtain the marginal consumption effects 
in (51) first write the ݏ௜ in terms of C: 
(A.8.6)  ݏ௜ ൌ ௎೔௒ ൌ ௎೔஼ା௎಼ା௎ವ 
Differentiate: 
(A.8.7)  ݀ݏ௜ ൌ ሺ஼ା௎಼ା௎ವሻௗ௎೔ି௎೔ሺௗ஼ାௗ௎಼ାௗ௎ವሻሺ஼ା௎಼ା௎ವሻమ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݏ௄ െ ݏ஽ሻሾௗ௎೔஼ െ ݏ௜ሺௗ஼஼ ൅ ௗ௎಼஼ ൅ ௗ௎ವ஼ ሻሿ  
A change in budget ௜ܷ does not alter the ݏ௝ ሺ݆ ് ݅ሻǡimplying 
(A.8.8)  
ௗ௎ೕ஼ െ ݏ௝ ቀௗ஼஼ ൅ ௗ௎಼஼ ൅ ௗ௎ವ஼ ቁ ൌ Ͳሺ݆ ് ݅ሻ  
For ݀ݏ௄ ് Ͳequation (A.8.8) leads to: 
(A.8.9)  
ௗ௎ವ஼ ൌ ௦ವଵି௦ವ ቀௗ஼஼ ൅ ௗ௎಼஼ ቁ  
Substitute this into (A.8.7) and obtain: 
(A.8.10)  ݀ݏ௄ ൌ ଵି௦಼ି௦ವଵି௦ವ ቂሺͳ െ ݏ஽ െ ݏ௄ሻ ௗ௎಼஼ െ ݏ௄ ௗ஼஼ ቃ  
Substitute this result in the quasi elasticity with respect to ݏ௄ in (A.8.5) to obtain (51a). The result 
for ܷ஽ is symmetric. In case of ܷ஻ǡ(A.8.8) leads to ݀ ௝ܷ ൌ ௦ೕଵି௦಼ି௦ವ ݀ܥሺ݆ ൌ ܭǡܦሻǤSubstitute this 
into (A.8.7) and the result in the quasi elasticity of C with respect to ݏ஻ in order to obtain (51c).  
 
The golden rule values for ݏ௄ and ݏ஽need to be determined simultaneously, since their values 
depend on each other. Setting both quasi-elasticities of C equal to zero we obtain two equations: 
(A.8.11) ߙሼ݊ ൅ ߠ ൅ ݇ଶ ො݃஺ሽ ൌ ఙ௦಼ଵି௦಼ି௦ವ  
(A.8.12)  ሼ݊ ൅ ߠ െ ݇ ො݃஺ሽ ൌ ఙ௦ವଵି௦಼ି௦ವ  
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The golden rule values are easily derived by solving ݏ௄ and ݏ஽from these two equations; the 
golden rule value of ݏ஻ the relevant quasi elasticity equal to zero. 
